

*The Department of State*

*Binding*

# bulletin

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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## A Report to the Nation on European Unity

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

I returned this week from a trip to Europe in company with Mr. Stassen, the Director of our Mutual Security Agency.

We have reported to the President; I have met, and shall meet further, with congressional leaders. Now I wish to report to you.

You may wonder why, with so much to do at home, we went so quickly abroad. The reason was the tremendous importance to the United States of real unity in Europe and the fact that it seemed that some of our European friends might be changing their minds about moving to this goal.

The problem in simple terms is this:

Europe is made up of people who possess an essential unity. They have given a clear and special meaning to the concept of Western civilization. Yet Europe has remained politically divided. This has led to recurrent wars, which have involved us. It has so weakened the Western European countries that today no one of them could offer strong resistance to the Red armies.

This situation both distresses and endangers us. Europe is the cradle of our civilization, and its industrial power could cruelly hurt us if it were controlled by our enemies.

It has been clear for some time that the biggest single postwar task would be to end the disunity in Europe which makes for weakness and war.

As the Second World War blazed up, I wrote "Continental Europe has been the world's greatest fire hazard. The whole structure is now consumed in flames. When the time comes to rebuild, we should not reproduce a demonstrated fire-trap."

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks on Feb. 12 and released to the press (No. 87) on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4938.

Today we and the free peoples of Europe are all face to face with that very problem. Shall a demonstrated fire-trap be rebuilt? Or cannot the wit of man devise something better?

When the first program of interim aid to Europe was before the Senate in 1947, I urged, before the Foreign Relations Committee, that in granting European aid "the basic idea should be, not the rebuilding of the prewar Europe, but the building of a new Europe, which, more unified, will be a better Europe." That point of view was emphatically adopted by Congress. It was written into the policy declaration of the Marshall Plan act and into our military assistance acts, and that concept underlay the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the stationing of United States troops in Europe. None of these measures was looked upon as in itself adequate to defend Europe. But these steps, together with the creation of a unified continental Europe, would produce a strength which could deter aggression.

These are the ideas that enlightened European leaders themselves put forth. We have not been trying to impress an American scheme on Europe but to support the plans of the European leaders themselves.

### What Europe Has Already Accomplished

They have already done much. As an outstanding example, they have created, under what is called the Schuman Plan, a single political authority to deal with the coal and iron resources of Germany, France, and the adjacent states. Last Sunday Mr. Stassen and I saw that authority first go into practical operation at its capital at Luxembourg.

Our European friends also tackled the vital problem of military unity. Last May the six continental countries of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty to create a European Defense Community. Under that treaty each of the six countries would give up having a separate national army on the Continent and would join in building there a single European army. It was contemplated that the treaties could be promptly ratified, so that the plan could be made operative in 6 months.

We in the United States were delighted that our European friends had taken this bold step toward making Europe strong and vigorous in its own right. However, the 6 months from last May went by without any effective steps to ratify, and the 6 months has now been prolonged to 9 months. This has been somewhat disconcerting to us, because the plans for our own security are based on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which does not include Germany, would be bolstered by the European Defense Community, which would draw on German military strength to create a solid continental European military establishment.

#### U.S. Contributions

During the past 7 years we have contributed about 30 billion dollars to Europe. We have tens of thousands of our armed forces in Europe. We have made the effort because the security of Europe vitally affects our own security. But our effort will not permanently serve Europe or ourselves or humanity unless it fits into a constructive program for European unity. Nothing that the United States can do will ever be enough to make Europe safe if it is divided into rival national camps.

President Eisenhower himself said recently that he was impressed with the "feebleness" of alternatives to the European Defense Community.

It was to discuss all of these problems that President Eisenhower asked Mr. Stassen and me to go to Europe. We went to seven European capitals—first Rome, then Paris, then London, then Bonn, then The Hague, then Brussels, and then Luxembourg. Our conclusion was that the project for a European Defense Community was not dead but only sleeping. We did not get any concrete promises or pledges from our European friends, and we did not give any. We did come

back with the feeling that there is a good chance that the European Defense Community will be brought into being. There are plenty of hurdles to be overcome. But we believe that there is a will to proceed. We hope that in the coming weeks this determination will be translated into concrete evidence that real progress is being made. Without that, future planning will be difficult. Candor requires us to say this.

NATO is now a far-flung organization. It includes not only countries in this hemisphere but in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. But the core of this far-flung structure is the six continental countries of Western Europe, which have made the European Defense Community treaty. Unless their military and economic strength is to be combined, as this treaty contemplates, the whole NATO organization has a fatal weakness. The European Defense Community is needed to give the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a stout and dependable heart.

I do not pretend that it is easy to accomplish this. National habits of thought and traditions have grown strong. The countries concerned have often in recent years been enemies. They have fought each other, and there are proud memories of victories and the bitter memories of defeat. This means that greatness is needed if unity is to be achieved. That quality, however, is not lacking. We saw it in fact in the peoples of Europe as they had to face the physical disaster of the recent floods. We also found among the statesmen of Western Europe, and so far as we could judge among the peoples of Western Europe, a real determination to take the hard political decisions which would bury the evil of the past and fortify the good.

After our friendly talks, we know, and gladly report, that the political leaders in each of these countries are men of vision and stature. They look not backward but forward. They see the land of promise that lies ahead and they desire to move into it.

Having spent most of my time in talking about what we hope the European countries will do, I would like to conclude with a mention of what the governments and peoples of Europe expect of us.

Our friends in Western Europe knew, when General Eisenhower was with them in Europe, how deep and firm was his interest in European unity—political, economic, and military. On this trip we

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were able to assure them that President Eisenhower continues to hold the same interest, the same conviction, with regard to European unity.

In each of these seven countries we visited we found good will and friendliness on the part of the governments and most of the people, but we also found some fear that the United States is not qualified to give the free world the kind of leadership which it needs at this critical moment. It is conceded that we have the material power, but it is questioned whether we have the accumulated wisdom to make the best use of that power. They are particularly concerned because they now have to deal with a new Republican administration, after having worked for 20 years in war and peace with a Democrat administration. To them, as to many Americans, a Republican administration is a novelty, and the unknown always carries a certain amount of fear.

The talks which we had with the political leaders of the countries we visited went far, I think, to dispel these fears insofar as official quarters are concerned. However, the public and the opposition parties seize upon incidents and upon statements made here which seem to them to be reckless. Unscrupulous persons use such incidents and statements as reasons why the European nations should not trust us.

It is important for us all to remember that we do carry a tremendous responsibility. Any false step could mean disaster not only for us but for our friends. Possibly our friends would suffer even more than we ourselves. Therefore, we must be sober and restrained in our national conduct.

That does not mean being timid and afraid to take the initiative, to speak frankly or to make hard decisions. Indecision, weakness, and vacillation are the qualities which most often lead to war. It does mean that in order to win and hold the confidence of those whom we need as friends and allies, we must at all times play the part of a Nation which is fully aware of the grave responsibility which it carries.

That is the kind of leadership we shall get from President Eisenhower, who is accustomed to carry heavy responsibilities and calmly make grave decisions. We shall do well to follow the example which he will set. At this dangerous time peace and security depend upon clear vision, righteous purpose, and firm performance. Let us all work together to achieve these goals.

## U. S. Voices Strong Support For European Defense Community

*Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 76 dated February 9

Mr. Stassen and I have just returned from a visit to Italy, France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In each of these countries we were welcomed with warm hospitality. We had friendly and comprehensive discussions with the national leaders of these seven nations, with the civilian and military representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. At Luxembourg we met with the newly organized European Coal and Steel Community, which is a first step in European integration.

While in Europe we discussed many matters, but the most discussed topic was the proposed European Defense Community. This project originated in Europe itself. It would combine in a single force the military potentials of six European countries, including France and Germany, which form the heart of continental Europe. It would create unification where, in the past, divisions have been disastrous. This unified continental force would in turn form part of the collective system of security which is being developed within the framework of the North Atlantic community, and which includes not only other continental European countries, of which the most recent additions are Greece and Turkey, but also Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.

A treaty to bring the European Defense Community into being was signed last May, but thus far the treaty has not been ratified by any of the signatories.

The United States has strongly supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the faith that the nations forming the core of continental Europe would themselves provide the basic foundations of their own security. The European Defense Community was the method by which these continental European nations themselves decided to achieve this essential goal. It was designed, among other things, to make Germany's economic and military potential available, and this is indispensable to an effective continental defense, but to do so in terms of an integrated European defensive force that could never be used for national aggrandizement.

President Eisenhower asked us to visit Europe to talk with its leaders about common problems and, particularly, to ascertain the likelihood of

<sup>1</sup> Made on Feb. 9 upon his arrival at Washington National Airport from a survey trip to Western Europe. Secretary Dulles was accompanied on the European trip, which was undertaken at the request of President Eisenhower, by Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security.

bringing the European Defense Community into being. This knowledge is important for us, because we cannot shape wisely our own programs without knowing what are the intentions of our European friends.

Mr. Stassen and I shall report to the President and to Members of the Congress. At the moment we limit ourselves to saying that we are, on the whole, encouraged by what we have been told by the leaders of the six continental European nations which have signed the treaty to create a European Defense Community. We do not minimize the difficulties confronted by those who have undertaken this great project, but we believe that there is a responsible determination to bring the project to completion.

There were other matters which occupied our attention while we were in Europe. A great tragedy

occurred in the flooding of large parts of Holland, Belgium, and Britain. We inspected some of the devastated areas and were impressed by the magnitude of the disaster and the courage with which the governments and peoples directly concerned were acting to surmount the disaster. As members of the committee appointed by the President to study the question of American cooperation to mitigate the disaster, we shall promptly confer with the President and with the other members of the committee—the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Agriculture—with a view to making recommendations as to how we may best assist our friends and allies in their plight. The response of the American people to this tragedy has made evident once again that they are concerned, not merely with the matters of military defense, but with relief of human suffering.

## Observations on NATO's Progress

*by Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson*

*Deputy U.S. Special Representative in Europe*<sup>1</sup>

The first thing I would like to say is that, in my opinion, the Atlantic alliance is in much sounder shape than I would think if I read only the newspapers. According to many press reports in this country, one would think that the defense build-up is a failure and the Atlantic alliance is on the verge of dissolution. This is of course not the case. It is true that the goals set a year ago in Lisbon for the defense build-up have not been fully attained.<sup>2</sup> It is true that it has been decided to concentrate in 1953 somewhat more on quality—that is, on the full equipment and training, up to very high standards, of the divisions activated at the end of 1952 plus a small increase by the end of the end of 1953—rather than upon less good training and equipment for a substantially larger number. It is true that it was decided by the North Atlantic Council in December to slow down somewhat the rate at which we pro-

ceed with building common NATO facilities such as airfields, communications, and so forth. But to draw from this the conclusions that the military build-up is a failure and that the Atlantic alliance is weakening is unwarranted. Economic expansion in Europe slowed down in 1952 to the point where previously set goals in a number of countries could not have been achieved without increased sacrifices that would have had grave consequences in terms of political and social stability. By common agreement, therefore, downward adjustments have had to be made.

But I see no justification for gloom. If the NATO countries were unable to adjust their programs according to political and economic realities, we would be in a strait-jacket indeed. We would fall into one of the traps that Stalin and company hope we will fall into—namely, that we will wreck ourselves on the rocks of economic and social reality and fall into discord, confusion, and disaster. This does not mean of course that we can afford to fall into the other trap, the trap of military weakness. The NATO military build-up must go on, is going on, and will go on. I can-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the American Council on NATO at New York City on Feb. 10 (press release 78).

<sup>2</sup>For documents on the North Atlantic Council meetings at Lisbon and at Paris in 1952, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 367, and Jan. 5, 1953, p. 3.

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not say that I am completely happy about it or that anybody is. But I think I would begin to get very uneasy if any of us ever got complacent as far as security is concerned and satisfied with our defenses. That I would consider a dangerous state indeed.

### **Building NATO Defenses**

I can report that I am completely satisfied with the spirit with which all are approaching the problem of building common NATO defenses. And in my opinion it is the spirit of unity in the West. The practice of unity, the continued building of institutions of unity, that is deterring the Russians from attack—and will deter them in the future—more than any particular state of armed preparedness we are able to reach at any given time. There are serious problems to be solved in each NATO country in connection with the NATO build-up. But I can assure you that they are being met with confidence, determination, and above all, in a spirit of NATO solidarity.

I am amazed at the marked difference that I often find between the tone and character of our official and informal communications with our NATO colleagues, and what I read of them in the papers.

What we are actually engaged in is an exercise in international budget-making for military purposes. And as you well know, nobody is ever very happy when budgets are made. Multiply the difficulties encountered in arriving at a national military budget by 14 and you begin to see the problem of arriving at a common NATO military program. It is natural to have a certain amount of national undercutting, to try to get other nations to carry a larger share of the burden. It is also normal to have military experts say that the resulting program is not adequate for defense, and it usually isn't. But out of all the democratic process of international budget-making, especially if it takes place in a spirit of cooperation and good will, comes a program that isn't too bad.

Our Atlantic association is truly something new under the sun, as you will realize if you try to find a precedent for it in time of peace. We look into each other's financial affairs. We look into each other's affairs of all kinds. We complain—all of us. We prod. But out of it all is growing a spirit and a practice and a structure of unity, in the building of which all of us can be proud to have a small part.

Let us consider now for a moment the progress that is being made on the continent of Europe toward building a close organic unity. There were overwhelming reasons, even before the appearance of the present threat, why the peoples of continental Europe should unite. Nationalistic wars and nationalistic economic policies had already resulted in such impoverishment and disaster that Europe was ready for a change. During the

### **Establishment of American Council on NATO**

Press release 79 dated February 10

*Following is the text of a message sent by Secretary Dulles to the American Council on NATO in New York on February 10:*

I have learned with pleasure of the establishment of the American Council on NATO for the purpose of coordinating the activities of American private organizations and educational institutions, in a program of information designed to increase the knowledge and secure the support of the American public for NATO's objectives.

NATO is vitally important for the security of the United States and the other free countries of the North Atlantic Community and for the peace of the world. It is equally important that our citizens appreciate the stake each of us has in accomplishing the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. For this reason, I am glad to convey to you my best wishes for the success of your endeavor.

long and horrible night of World War II, the people of Europe were pondering the senselessness of war. And during that night was born a grim determination that nationalist aggression in Europe, and especially German aggression, must never happen again, that Europe must be so reorganized as to make it impossible.

With Germany under Allied occupation it was possible for several years following the War to avoid facing up to the problem of how and when this was to be done. And then arose the threat of Soviet aggression against the whole of Western Europe, Germany included. But how admit Germany's rearmament and industrial revival without subjecting Europe once more to the danger of German militarism? There was only one politically feasible answer and European statesmen gave it: Organic unity, with armies and economies and political authorities in Western Europe so merged as to make aggressive war by any European country against another impossible, but so merged also as to make possible the efficient building of common defenses against the threat from the East.

### **European Unity and the Atlantic Community**

However, if you examine closely the record of the past 6 years you find that the movement toward unity in Europe had its genesis in the context of Atlantic association, and that its growth and development have been dependent upon and intertwined with the development of the Atlantic community. European leaders have recognized from the first that institutional unity on the continent of Europe could only be achieved, and could only be successful, as an integral part of the Atlantic community. For it was clear, and is still clear, that continental Europe, no matter how or-



ganized, cannot solve major problems of defense and economic viability except as part of an Atlantic community embracing also Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.

On the other hand, you will recall that the Atlantic pact is a direct descendant of the Brussels pact, and that action of the North Atlantic Council in 1950 led to the Pleven Plan for a European army as part of a NATO defense force. You also know that as the actual work of building an effective NATO defense has gone along, it has become increasingly clear that successful military, political, and economic defense of the Atlantic community requires organic unity in the heart of continental Europe.

There should not be, there must not be, any illusions that European unity can in some way be a substitute for Atlantic unity. If there are people in the United States who are promoting European unity on the assumption that a new and larger European entity can then provide for the security and economic well-being of Europe without any further responsibility on our part, then I can say that they are promoting the same kind of disaster that led to World War I and World War II. I can say the same thing about any in Europe who seek European unity in the hope that a new continental grouping can follow a neutralist course in Europe, independent of the United States and Great Britain.

No, the developing organic structure of European unity has meaning, has possibility, and offers real hope for the future only as part of a developing Atlantic community. And in this connection I might say that this only adds a powerful argument in favor of pushing ahead with Atlantic cooperation—political, economic, and military. Otherwise, we run the danger of being victims of the illusions to which I have already referred.

The European Coal and Steel Community is already a fact. Its executive and its assembly are already in operation; a common market for coal embracing the six member countries is expected to go into operation today, and that for steel will follow this spring.

The drafting of a treaty for a European political community has made substantial progress and the work is progressing.

#### **EDC Prospects Brighter**

The great problem that is immediately in front of the countries comprising the community of six is the ratification of the treaty providing for a European Defense Community (Edc). Notwithstanding the flood of press reports to the contrary, I would say that the prospects for the ratification of the Edc treaty appear brighter than they did last fall. It is not logical to suppose that such a revolutionary proposal as the giving up of national sovereignty over armed forces would sail through the ratification process in the countries concerned without a period of stop, look, and listen, without

full debate, without some voices being raised in opposition, without the rallying of political forces in support. Last fall, the Edc treaty was more or less wrapped in felt and kept on one side. Today it is out in the open. And the usual fireworks surrounding any major change in foreign policy, much less one so far reaching in character as this are taking place.

I base my confidence in the ratification of the Edc on three points. One is that there is no politically acceptable alternative to it in Europe. Second, I detect no lessening of determination among the leaders of the countries concerned to bring about ratification. And third, I can detect no lessening of popular support on the continent of Europe for the Edc treaty. Certainly there is criticism. Certainly there are attempts to clarify the treaty through additional protocols. But there is little ground for believing that the treaty will not be ratified. I say this in the knowledge that there may be juridical obstacles to overcome. But I believe that where there is government will, and popular will, such difficulties of this nature as may arise *will* be overcome.

Now, I must say some things that may seem to be at variance with my optimism on NATO progress and Edc prospects. But I think you will find that there is no real contradiction.

In my opinion, we have entered a period that is difficult and potentially very dangerous to the Atlantic alliance and to the future peace of the world. There are several reasons why I feel this to be true.

The first is that, while the danger from the East has not diminished, the more obvious pressures on the West for sacrifice and bold action have lessened.

Free and self-governing peoples have demonstrated many times in history that when faced with a powerful and immediate danger they are able to unite, make enormous sacrifices, and thus save themselves. But there is no precedent in history, as far as I know, for self-governing peoples uniting, maintaining a high level of armaments, and erecting common economic and political defenses in time of peace when danger seems a few steps removed.

The Soviet Union can choose its strategy. It can unleash an all-out war at any time, and we must be prepared to counter it. Or it can play a long waiting game such as that outlined by Stalin in his Bolshevik article last fall. Stalin believes that over a period of years the Soviet Union, compact geographically, self-sufficient economically, and with a dictatorial government, will grow economically and militarily stronger while the free countries of the West, disunited, luxury-loving, will either grow weaker or not grow strong as fast as the Soviet Union so that in the end we might be taken over without much trouble. But of course he would take advantage of weakness to start a war at any time. We on our side are there-

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fore forced to build against both contingencies: We must build defenses adequate to deter or repel an all-out attack from the Kremlin. And we must also do all the things necessary to maintain our margin of economic and political strength over a long period of years. If we are not able to do so, then I think that we are in danger, sooner or later, of being attacked.

The NATO countries are much stronger militarily than they were 2 years ago. Yet we have already seen how minor reductions in the imminence of danger have led to mounting political pressures for reductions in defense expenditures. Stalin's article and the speech at the Moscow conference made it clear that the Soviets may very well choose to use the longer-range strategy. And this has already resulted in a noticeable lessening of willingness in the West to make sacrifices. We have not slipped very far as yet in actual performance, but my opinion is that we are in danger of doing so in the period ahead. That would be very serious indeed. For as Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons recently:

When we see that the risk of a general war seems to have receded it is because we ourselves have grown stronger and more united. If we were to weaken we would lose all we have gained.

#### **Economic Problems**

A second reason why the present period is a critical one for the unity of the West is that we have not yet taken decisive steps to solve on a permanent and businesslike basis the grave economic problems that confront us. I only need mention Europe's persistent dollar shortage, the convertibility of many currencies; the slow-down in Europe's economic expansion during the last year; the need of the underdeveloped countries of the world for a great expansion of capital development; the need, as outlined by the Paley Report, for a great increase in raw materials production throughout the world.

It is easy to point out the problems. It is much less easy to find politically acceptable solutions to the many and complex things that have to be done in the economic realm to pull Europe together, to pull the Atlantic community together, to pull the free world together. And yet, solutions must be found. The question is, will we act fast enough, and with enough boldness, if the immediate danger of Soviet aggression is removed.

Politically and morally we are also at a turning point. Stalin has said very clearly that Soviet propaganda and Soviet political strategy and Soviet economic warfare, which already work night and day, will work even harder to promote disunity among the free world and especially among the leading countries of the NATO alliance. We all agree upon the central importance of unity and yet I am personally convinced that

unity must be built around institutions and fast-moving projects that attract the conscious loyalty and sacrifice of peoples. I believe that in the matter of organization we have reached a point that is somewhat static, and this to my mind is not a healthy condition. I believe that unless we move forward with projects of unity, we will slip backwards and fall into the Soviet trap.

The fact that the problems of which I have been speaking are unresolved is responsible, in my opinion, for most of the tension and unrest visible in relations between members of the Atlantic alliance. I don't think these tensions are at all deep or serious. But people want to know when we are going to move ahead, where we are going, and who is going to do what next.

You can see by now why I believe that the work of you who are gathered here is of such central importance. Democratic governments simply cannot, in my opinion, move ahead with the speed and boldness necessary to solve the problems before us unless they are strongly supported by public opinion. The freedom, the democratic self-government, and the national mores of the West are our glory; but at a time when we are subject to a concentrated attack by the monolithic dictatorship of the East, these are also a handicap. They are a handicap which I think we can overcome. But we are going to have to make a vast and a conscious effort if we overcome it.

The people in our democracies are going to have to be kept, as a result of conscious effort, in a state of informed alertness. They must fully appreciate, and never be allowed to forget, the character and wide dimensions of the danger that confronts us. They must be continuously informed of the many and complex things that have to be done if we of the West are to maintain in the years ahead our margin of strength over that of the Soviet bloc. Public loyalty must be attracted to grand designs of unity; but these grand designs must also be broken down in people's thinking into the many grubby things that have to be done and individual sacrifices that have to be made, if the world is to avoid an atomic war. People must be willing to do more than die for their freedom; they must be willing to support such uninteresting and unattractive things as taxation, tariff reductions, investment guarantees and the like, and to understand the relation of these and a host of other minor sacrifices and solutions to the grand design for peace and security.

There is therefore no more important work in the world than that upon which you are embarking. It will be hard work. It will yield few startling successes and few major satisfactions. But it is work that has to be done. I therefore salute you, I congratulate you, and I fervently wish you success. We will do all that is possible to work closely with you toward the attainment of our common objectives.

## Postwar Development of the German Press

by Richard Straus

Today, 8 years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, a substantial number of West German newspapers are doing an honest job of reporting facts to the people. Their performance may seem commonplace enough to Americans, but it is by no means commonplace in Germany—or in many other countries of the world. Except for the brief span of the Weimar Republic, the German press has traditionally and habitually been under the control of church, state, or party. Accordingly, the German people, until recently, have had very limited acquaintance with objective reporting.

The achievements of the postwar German press are particularly significant because they follow a period in which the German newspapers served as a puppet to Hitler's "Minister of Popular Enlightenment" and spoke only with the voice of Dr. Goebbels. After Hitler's defeat in 1945, there was an interval of a few months when there was no German press at all. Then the new press was born. It underwent a period of incubation during which its climate of development, its scope of operations, and the identity of its editors and publishers were determined by the military occupation authorities of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The method used to develop a democratic press for Germany was extraordinary, but at the time and under the circumstances it was the only feasible one.

The fact that the German Federal Republic has many newspapers performing the primary function of a democratic press means a great deal. So, too, does the fact that it has some outstandingly courageous editors and publishers who are determined to preserve the present freedom of the press. These men are vigilant to forestall legislative attempts to limit that freedom. They need to be, for they are in conflict with a long-lived tradition of authoritarian control.

State and federal officials are not unanimously in favor of a free press. Some of them resent the quickness of the democratic press to expose incom-

petence or corruption in high places. Certain official fingers twitch with eagerness to seize control. Party leaders, bred in the tradition of rigid party discipline, make intermittent attempts to coerce independent editors into making editorial policy dovetail with party policy. Also, the new German press encounters in the people much apathy, cynicism, and ignorance about current issues.

### The Press Under the Nazis

In 1932, the final year of the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist Party press consisted of only 120 of Germany's 976 political papers and claimed no more than 3,000,000 of the country's 19,000,000 circulation. It had developed unsystematically and spoke with a variety of voices. Goebbels, who had been too busy training young orators for the Party to give much attention to the press, wrote: "We have the best orators in the world but our press is our 'problem child.'" Machinery for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the party press had been lacking. Creation of the Party Propaganda Department with Goebbels as its chief provided that machinery.

Max Amann became Party Press Director in charge of press business management. Since 1921, Amann had been business manager of the party and also of Hitler's principal propaganda organ and source of income, the Munich *Völkischer Beobachter* with its vast Eher Publishing House. Otto Dietrich, a journalist in his own right and Hitler's publicity director, became Party Press Chief, responsible for policy and content of the newspapers. Under their tutelage, the party press quickly became a well-disciplined child.

Authority to control the non-party press was lacking until 1933, when the Nazis came into power. Just before the Reich elections of March 1933, Hitler and Papen obtained Hindenburg's signature on a decree that stated: "Restrictions on

personal liberty and on freedom of speech and of the press are permissible beyond the limitations placed upon them by law." A week after the elections, Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to sign a decree making Goebbels a member of the Government and establishing the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda—with Goebbels in charge.

The new Ministry took over a number of powers that had been the prerogative of other ministries during the Republic. Certain of these powers were helpful in establishing control of the press; from the Ministry of Economics, the Propaganda Ministry acquired its authority over all commercial advertising activities of the State, and from the Ministry of the Interior its supervisory powers over press and radio and also the censorship function.

Party Press Chief Dietrich became Under Secretary of State in the Propaganda Ministry, with responsibility for guiding editors politically, a function carried out by means of daily directives that had the force of law. He not only told the non-party newspapers what they should print but also provided them with the approved phraseology for use in sensitive situations.

In September 1933 the Reich Press Chamber was established with Party Press Director Amann as its president. It was Amann's job to exert economic pressures on such elements of the non-party press as the Propaganda Ministry wished to eliminate. He had the power to issue orders to the press and the orders had the effect of laws. Hitler's Editorial Law of 1933 reduced the publisher to a figurehead obliged to take his editorial policy ready-made from the State; it compelled him to pay editors whom he could neither hire nor fire and to obey all directions filtering down from Dr. Goebbels. The party had in truth become the State, and publishers who diverged from the party line quickly disappeared from the scene.

#### The Problem Facing the Victors

In 1945 occupation officials understandably regarded with deep suspicion all publishers and editors who had been active for any considerable period during the Nazi regime. They were scarcely the material needed for the development of an independent press that could be trusted to serve the best interests of the German people.

First, Military Government officials had to get rid of the puppet press of the Nazis. Then they had to create a new press. To accomplish the first step, SHAEF<sup>1</sup> issued a pre-surrender directive on November 24, 1944, suspending all German information media. On May 12, 1945, SHAEF paved the way for establishing a new press by amending

<sup>1</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. For texts of the 1944 directive and the 1945 amendment, see *Germany 1947-1949—The Story in Documents*, Department of State publication 3556, p. 594.

the directive to provide for a licensing system operated by Military Government. Licensing appeared to be the only practicable way of keeping Nazis and Nazi collaborators out of publishing until a hand-picked fledgling press could gain experience in democratic practices and build up a substantial circulation.

To bridge the gap between the press suspension and establishment of the licensing system, OMGUS<sup>2</sup> published 10 German-language newspapers in the American zone and in the American sector of Berlin. With one exception, these Army-sponsored papers ceased publication as soon as licensed German papers could replace them. The exception was *Die Neue Zeitung*, which has been continued under the High Commission until the present time as an example of American journalism and as an instrument for explaining American policies.

#### Starting the New Press

Only individuals with records showing opposition to the Nazis qualified to man the new press. But prewar publishers and editors who had opposed the Nazis had long since lost their plants, machinery, and capital. The plants and machinery of publishing belonged to Nazis or to men who had found it comfortable and profitable to cooperate with them. To resolve the impasse, OMGUS required ineligible owners of plants and equipment to lease them to the eligible at the very low figure recommended by the Military Government.

Besides low-cost mandatory leases, OMGUS had to devise other ways of helping the approved but impoverished newspaper establishments. With its first authorization of a license—to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in July 1945—OMGUS imposed a license fee of 20 percent of gross newspaper receipts. By January 1, 1948, when the fees were discontinued, a fund of more than 48 million reichsmarks had been built up. Early in 1948 OMGUS established a press cooperative bank, the *Wirtschaftliche Genossenschaft der Presse* (Wigo), with a grant of RM 36 million from this fund and authorized the bank to make low-interest loans to the licensed newspapers and agencies of the American zone. The balance of RM 12 million was distributed equitably among the 48 newspapers then operating in the zone. The object was to help them finance improvements and buy available essential equipment.

#### The Golden-Cage Period

Although the publisher of a licensed paper was shielded from many of the problems and hardships that normally plague an independent publisher who is up against keen competition, he had to toe a clearly marked line drawn by OMGUS to retain his advantages, including his license to

<sup>2</sup> Office of Military Government, United States.



operate.<sup>3</sup> During the first 3 years of licensing, controls were numerous and rigid, with some variation from zone to zone. In the area of American control, applicants for licenses were carefully screened, and their selection of editors and reporters was subject to the approval of OMGUS. Both American and French authorities opposed party newspapers and during the licensing period reduced them to the status of brief information bulletins. The British, on the contrary, favored party newspapers, on the principle that political parties have a right to make their views known. The French appointed editors for the papers in their zone and also assigned a French official to each paper to supervise the German staff. The British censored copy in advance of publication but did not post a supervisor in each office. The Americans limited themselves to post-publication examination of the newspapers and close liaison with the editors.

The acute shortage of paper necessitated control of both production and distribution, and a ceiling on the number of licensed newspapers. As long as the press avoided belittling criticism of the Military Government and democratic processes, adopted certain journalistic procedures that had become standard practice in democratic countries, and kept the physical size of editions and the advertising within prescribed bounds, it could depend upon receiving a quarterly ration of paper.

Paradoxically, the paper shortage helped the licensed press to build up circulation at the same time that military control of distribution enabled the publishers to escape the worry of cut-throat competition for paper. The licensed publishers had what amounted to a monopoly on the only form of paper available to the German people. Paper bags, wrapping paper, and toilet paper were not to be had. The inflated reichsmarks bought less and less food and clothing but they were good for the purchase of newspapers, and newspapers had many uses that had nothing to do with reading.

In screening editors and publishers, OMGUS placed primary emphasis upon a record of opposition to nazism. Professional qualifications came second. The majority of those licensed had been out of the publishing business since 1933. Many had endured great hardship in concentration camps or at forced labor. Few retained their prewar vigor. Some of the younger men who qualified on the basis of their anti-Nazi records had unimpaired vitality but lacked experience in the newspaper field.

The average age of 113 licensed publishers and editors of the American zone was 49. Owing to wartime and postwar shifts in population, only 50 percent of the newspaper operators were native to the *Land*, or state, where they published. In Bavaria, stronghold of German Catholicism, the

editors were predominantly Catholic. In Hesse, most of the editors had broken away from all church affiliations, and some had turned Marxist. In Wuerttemberg-Baden, about half the editors were protestants, half Catholics. Only 43 of the 113 were university graduates; 11 had passed the *Abitur*, or qualifying examination, but had not attended a university; 22 had had only elementary school education and had taken up writing in the course of socialist activity. About 25 percent had no previous newspaper experience whatsoever.

### Portents of Release

On June 18, 1948, the Western Powers invalidated the inflated reichsmark in their zones and introduced the deutschemark, or D-Mark, at a ratio of one of the new for ten of the old. In July paper went on the free list and Military Government stopped rationing paper among the licensed publishers. These two events made important changes in the status of the licensed press.

The publishers now had more freedom of decision but less freedom from responsibility. They could determine their edition size and frequency of issue; they could apportion space to advertising as they saw fit and introduce new features or projects without OMGUS permission. But they also had to assume new responsibilities and face problems that had not previously concerned them. For instance, they had to compete in the open market for paper. Furthermore, the new currency was scarce and people thought twice before spending it. With paper available in other forms, newspapers were once more just something to be read. People became aware and somewhat critical of content. It dawned on the publishers that reader interest was a key factor in maintaining circulation. By no means all of them were confident of their ability to create it.

In the fall of 1948, 19 of the licensed editors and publishers came to the United States for a 6-week seminar of the American Press Institute at Columbia University. This group was the first of many to benefit by the postwar exchange program. The experience helped; so did the assistance given by visiting American journalists in Germany. Nevertheless, the way ahead was uncertain.

The wind of freedom blew a bit chilly around the German press. When word passed that licensing soon would end and with it the protection from heavy competition with the legal owner of his leased press, many a licensed publisher retreated to the far side of his golden cage and tried to latch the door after him.

### The End of Licensing

Shortly after the removal of controls on newsprint, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, American Military Governor, decided to end licensing. The cold war,

<sup>3</sup> For texts of OMGUS instructions to licensees issued in 1946 and 1947, see *ibid.*, pp. 596-600.

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the realization of the link between German economic recovery and European recovery, the functioning of democratic procedures in the *Laender* governments, and the plans for establishing the German Federal Republic, all contributed to hastening the transfer of responsibilities from Military Government to the Germans.

The occupation authorities had helped set up the democratic machinery, but it was the Germans themselves who had to operate it and make it work. A free press was essential to the democratic operation of the new Germany. The time had come to open the field to all comers and see how the sheltered licensed press would make out on its own. On September 30, 1948, General Clay informed his *Land* officers that licensing would end as soon as the *Laender* enacted legislation to protect the freedom of the press.<sup>4</sup>

Some of the officials of Military Government shared the misgivings of the licensed publishers about the outcome of this move. Both groups feared a return of the old type of nationalistic paper; both feared that Nazi owners would get back their plants and crowd the licensed publishers out of business. The publishers also feared encroachment by the Government.

Military Government provided the Minister-President of each *Land* in the American zone with an explicit statement of what legislation designed to guarantee the freedom of the press should contain. It should:

- a. . . . implement the general guarantees of the free press as expressed in *Land* constitutions and . . . . exclude the institution of any system of special licensing not required of all other business enterprises.
- b. . . . protect the press from governmental domination or domination by special interests.
- c. . . . guarantee the prerogatives of a free press in obtaining and publishing information of public interest.
- d. . . . guarantee that there be no arbitrary interference by the police or other administrative bodies in the free flow and dissemination of news and printed matter.
- e. . . . specifically exclude the revival of honor courts, press chambers, or other forms of organized press control exercised by the Nazi regime.
- f. . . . prohibit censorship or control of the content of news and published material except through legal process in the event of a violation of existing laws regarding libel, defamation, fraud, indecency or breach of the peace.

It took longer to obtain "adequate" legislation than the American authorities anticipated. The first reaction to the request for legislation to insure a free press was a resolution passed by the Bavarian Landtag in October 1948 urging transfer of licensing power from Military Government to German authorities. In fact, the initial idea of all the *Laender* Governments was to rewrite the old Press Law of 1874 with new touches that aimed at restricting the freedom of the press.

Passage of the Press Law of 1874 had been the first move made by any German Government toward freedom of the press, but it wasn't much of

a move. The law abolished censorship and provided that "freedom of the press is subject only to the limitations set forth or admitted in the present law." But what it gave in one statement, it took away in some subsequent clause. It allowed the Chancellor to keep out of journalism anybody he saw fit to exclude. Although it provided severe penalties for printing slanderous, obscene, or treasonable matter, inciting to riot, or revealing troop movements in time of war, it afforded no protection against police measures. Since police needed no court order to seize a newspaper and since there was no provision for recovery of damages against overzealous police officials, it was easy to harry a newspaper out of business.

Bismarck used the Press Law to suppress the entire Social Democrat press in 1878, after two Socialists had attempted to assassinate Emperor William I. It was not until 1890, when the 1878 Law Against Socialists was repealed, that a modicum of freedom returned to the German press. The Weimar Republic had retained the Press Law of 1874 but had rendered it harmless by means of an impressive constitutional listing of civil rights. Outmoded and restrictive, it had been pretty well forgotten when the *Laender* resurrected it in 1948 and 1949.

Actually, the first drafts of the press laws presented by the several legislatures were a shot in the arm to the licensed press. Editors and publishers stopped brooding about the hazards of competition and began a battle for adequate laws.

Editors quickly detected—and sharply denounced—dangerous loopholes, ambiguities, and subterfuges in the various drafts presented. The legislators were loathe to give up provisions for severe penalties for press attacks against government officials, but gradually and reluctantly they crossed out the most offensive clauses. Wuerttemberg-Baden was the first *Land* to enact a press law that passed muster with OMGUS, March 24, 1949. Bremen was last to have licensing controls lifted; its press law was approved on September 5, 1949.<sup>5</sup>

OMGUS had safeguarded its own interests and those of the Occupation troops with its General License No. 3, of May 2, 1949, continuing in force an earlier regulation forbidding information activity which:<sup>6</sup>

- a. Incites to riot or resistance to Military Government, jeopardizes the occupying troops, or otherwise endangers military security;
- b. Propagates former National Socialist or related "voelkisch" ideas, such as racism and race hatred, or propagates any fascist or anti-democratic ideas, or any militarist ideas, or pan-Germanism or German imperialism;
- c. Constitutes a malicious attack upon policies or personnel of Military Government, aims to disrupt unity among the Allies, or seeks to evoke the distrust and

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 600.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 601-602.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 601, 599.

nostility of the German people against any Occupying Power;

d. Appeals to Germans to take action against democratic measures undertaken by Military Government.

### The New Freedom

Just after licensing ended, Military Government gave way to the civilian administration of occupied Germany. The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) inherited a burgeoning crop of problems associated with the sudden opening of the press to all comers and the need to protect the protégés of the licensing system from too rough competition with the protégés of the late Nazi system.

From the moment licensing ended, newspapers multiplied at an astounding rate. In Bavaria alone, 25 new papers appeared the day that licensing was discontinued, and the first week brought more than a hundred. By October 1949, 650 new papers had appeared in the four *Laender* of the American zone. The vast majority were insignificant county or local sheets that depended upon a matrix agency for news and editorials. The total also included many local editions of larger papers.

Relations between the now "ex-licensed" press and the unlicensed press were far from cordial. The former organized a loose federation called the *Gesamtverband der deutschen Zeitungsverleger*, or National Union of German Newspaper Publishers. The post-licensing publishers formed the *Verein deutscher Zeitungsverleger*, or Association of German Newspaper Publishers, nicknamed the *Altverleger* (old publishers). They regarded the *Gesamtverband* as a group of upstarts and usurpers. For its part, the *Gesamtverband* was skeptical regarding the political probity of the *Altverleger*, who, whether or not they belonged to the Nazi Party, had managed to get through the period of Nazi domination in pretty good financial shape.

The near coincidence of the end of licensing and the currency reform severely affected the position of the ex-licensed publishers. Their capital was cut 90 percent, and the Wigo loan fund shrank overnight to 2.5 million DM.

This development brought into high relief the key problem of the leased plants. The leases were an important aid given the licensed publishers by the Occupation. The old publishers, now free to run newspapers, were without printing plants because their own were under mandatory lease to their rivals on unremunerative terms. The old publishers were thus forced to make shift with presses intended for other types of printing. The year 1950 marked the beginning of the expiration of the leases and under the circumstances renewal at any price appeared unlikely. Indeed, there was reason to think that the old publishers would not wait for expiration. With responsibility for domestic matters in German hands under the occu-

pation statute, no German court could be expected to uphold leases obtained under duress.

To safeguard the leases for their original term, OMGUS established the Newspaper Leases Review Board in May 1949. This board had sole and final authority to review leases made under the authority of Military Government. In the fall of 1949, the new Allied High Commission retained the Newspaper Leases Review Board and promulgated its Law No. 13, which provided that "No German Court shall render a decision impeaching the validity or legality of any regulation, directive, decision or order published by Military Government," and that the validity of a Military Government order must be determined by the Occupation authorities.

In practice, the Review Board proved effective in adjusting differences of opinion between owner and licensed publisher as to a fair rate on the lease for the remainder of its term.

Early in the post-licensing period, the *Gesamtverband* asked HICOG for counterpart funds to permit publishers to borrow enough money at low interest to continue in business. HICOG approved, and the Bluecher (Marshall Plan) Ministry of the Bonn Government established a new revolving press fund of 15 million DM to be handled by WIGO. This money was available to any non-Communist newspaper publisher who was considered a legitimate risk.

Wigo set up a large committee composed of *Gesamtverband* and *Altverleger* members from the three Western zones. The committee made recommendations to the *Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau*, or Reconstruction Loan Corporation (RLC), which reviewed the risk involved. If the RLC rejected a request that had committee approval, HICOG reserved the right to make the final decision. However, in the event that HICOG decided to grant the loan, the Federal Republic asked to be released from its contingent obligation to the United States for any part of the loan that was not repaid.

In November 1950, the committee went to work. By the end of February 1951, it had examined 200 applications for loans and approved 105 for a total of DM 13.5 million, leaving DM 1.5 million for the West Berlin newspapers. (The latter, because of Berlin's special status as an island in the Soviet zone, remained under licensing.) Then the RLC began its investigations and passed its recommendations on to the Marshall Plan Ministry, which asked HICOG to release the first portion of the press fund on April 5, 1951.

As requests came in to HICOG, it became increasingly apparent that all was not well with the committee's policy of distribution. Unwilling to discriminate against the politically sound elements of the old publishers and wishing to avoid charges of favoritism toward the ex-licensed press, HICOG had agreed to the proposal of the Bluecher Ministry that *Altverleger* as well as *Gesamtverband* members should be eligible for loans. However,



Hicog had been well aware that inclusion of the *Altverleger* would pose some delicate problems.

As far as Hicog was concerned, the purpose of the press fund was to safeguard the independence of the most responsible elements of the press. The committee, however, had promptly agreed on a division between *Gesamtverband* and *Altverleger*, on the basis of circulation statistics, at a ratio of seven to three, respectively. Representatives of both factions wanted as many as possible of their constituents to have loans. Consequently, to make the fund go further, the committee spread it very thin. Small papers asking for small loans had the best chance of getting what they asked. Requests from large and influential papers such as the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich, which were in dire need of substantial loans to help them buy plants or buildings, were rejected at the first glance. Political integrity and high journalistic standards had little influence on the committee.

The German Federal Republic, having incurred a contingent obligation to the United States for the amount of the fund, tried to protect itself by making extremely rigid conditions for credit. The RLC demanded that local banks give 100 percent security for the loans, and the banks in turn required high collateral from the newspapers. This raised the uninviting prospect that the papers would be placed in the power of the banks and that the independence which the press fund was intended to preserve would thus be jeopardized.

Some of the papers that Hicog wanted to help most were unable to raise the collateral demanded by the banks. As an alternative, it was proposed that such papers as could not meet the demands of the banks should obtain guaranties from the *Laender* governments. However, State domination was no more palatable to Hicog than domination by the banking interests.

#### HICOG to the Rescue

Until the summer of 1951, Hicog had deliberately remained on the side lines, but in that summer members of the press and members of the *Gesamtverband-Altverleger* Committee itself became so concerned over the handling of the fund that they asked Hicog to come to the rescue. The Bluecher Ministry was receptive to Hicog's proposal of a new approach to handling the fund and the establishment of new procedures. The large committee was replaced by a new committee of five, with one *Gesamtverband* representative each from the British and the American zones, one from the West Berlin press, one *Altverleger* representative, and one official from Hicog's Office of Public Affairs. From this point on, the actual grant of funds was to Wigo, with the committee serving in advisory capacity to Hicog, the granter of the fund.

The establishment of priority lists of applicants

for loans solved the problem of distribution on an equitable basis and in amounts that were large enough to do some good. The committee established the following specific criteria for making up the lists: political importance of the paper; need to purchase new printing presses and real estate for building purposes; and refinancing of high-interest bank loans required for necessary capital investments. Geographical location was also a factor. The committee agreed on the importance of helping a good paper in districts bordering the Soviet zone and also in areas where the neo-Nazi movement was growing in strength.

The new committee used the work of the old one as a basis for developing the primary and secondary lists. Because the fund was a revolving fund, repayment was carefully scheduled. Papers on the secondary list had to wait until the primary priority papers had been served and had begun to repay their loans. This method permitted meeting the substantial requirements of the best papers first and had the advantage of giving all creditable firms assurance that their needs would be served in due time. Of the first papers to receive loans, nine were Social Democrat in character, seven Christian Democratic Union, three Free Democrat, and 25 independent.

The end of licensing did not immediately provoke a circulation war. The old publishers bided their time, leaving the first foray to the small-time papers. But when the larger houses in the *Altverleger* resumed business, the war began. The *Wiesbaden Tageblatt*, for instance, began publication in mid-September 1949 by distributing 90,000 free copies for the first 3 days, 25,000 for the rest of the month, and free delivery to all subscribers until mid-October. This open-handedness cost the publisher DM 100,000, and yet, as of the end of November, he had failed to achieve his objective of 20,000 subscriptions. Other large establishments followed his example—though few went quite so far.

To meet this kind of competition, the members of the *Gesamtverband* were in many instances obliged to reduce subscription rates and sometimes advertising rates as well. Some of the *Altverleger* did what they could to discredit their ex-licensed rivals by charging that the *Gesamtverband* papers were "stooges" of the occupation authorities, while the *Altverleger* alone had the real good of the German people at heart and was free to defend "national rights."

Despite these efforts of the *Altverleger* and the outcropping of chains and syndicates, the *Gesamtverband* held and still holds the advantage in circulation and reader interest. By February 1950, after 6 months of full-scale competition with the *Altverleger*, the ex-licensed press of the American zone, although issuing only one-sixth of the newspapers then published, had three-fourths of the circulation. The *Gesamtverband* papers had been reduced from 59 to 54 in the 6-month

period, but none of the 5 dropped out for reasons directly connected with the new competition.

In the German Federal Republic as a whole, by the summer of 1950—a year after the end of licensing—the circulation of the *Gesamtverband* was approximately 6.5 million out of a total of 9.5 million. The average circulation of the ex-licensed newspapers was 76,000, that of the *Altverleger* papers was under 4,000.

The rush of wartime publishers to reestablish hundreds of little local sheets of the *Heimatblaetter* type, once so popular in Germany, turned out to be ill-advised. Times had changed. Populations, even of very small towns, had shifted. By 1949 approximately one-fifth of West Germany's population was made up of refugees without roots or traditional associations in the places of their resettlement. These refugees, by no means illiterate, had little interest in a hometown paper that slighted news of national and international affairs in favor of local gossip. If the refugees had money to buy a newspaper at all, they wanted one that gave full coverage of important news. Similarly, Germans under 35 years of age had no sentimental recollection of the *Heimatblaetter* type of paper and wanted something more up-to-date. Where the *Heimatblaetter* offered competition, the *Gesamtverband* press introduced local editions of the main issue, with two pages devoted to community news items.

Shortly after licensing ended, the march of world events served to sharpen the German readers' interest in objective and full news accounts of happenings in Germany and in the outside world. He could get the most for his money from the ex-licensed press, which, on the whole, had maintained high standards of reporting. He wanted information of changes in occupation policy, and he wanted to follow the moves in the development of European union. The participation of West Germany in the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery was one thing in which most Germans were interested; the war between Communist North Korea and independent South Korea, with its somewhat frightening analogy to East and West Germany, was another. Internally, a number of ex-licensed editors have taken the initiative in forcing investigations of unhealthy political situations.

Evidence that the ex-licensed press will continue to hold the bulk of circulation is found in the fact that the most successful old publishers are those that conform to the standards set by the *Gesamtverband*.

### The Current Situation

By bringing together the leaders of the rival press organizations in a common cause, the press fund has been responsible for wiping out much of the earlier resentment and bitterness that characterized relations between the two factions. In the

fall of 1952 the rival central organizations buried the hatchet and merged into the *Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger*.

Each year brings improvement in the quality of the major newspapers. Not every paper in West Germany invariably distinguishes between news and editorial opinion, but the majority try to report events as they happen and to quote individuals accurately. Except for the seven Communist papers, the press is strongly anti-Communist.

Each year since 1948 groups of German editors, reporters, and students of journalism have come to America to study, to observe, and sometimes to work on one of our newspapers. Since January 1950, a first-class school of journalism has been functioning in Munich in connection with *Die Abendzeitung*. Large papers in other cities often provide on-the-job training for promising newcomers.

Not every editor in West Germany wants to be the first to call public attention to wrongs. Many of them, as is the case elsewhere, are inclined to wait for some more stalwart fellow to break the ice. But it is important that in these few years, with help and encouragement from the outside, Germany has produced a remarkable number of courageous champions of the democratic spirit.

Not long ago an Offenbach paper exposed the intention of the local government to prevent a Jewish doctor from opening an obstetrical clinic.

### West German Newspapers

The leading papers of West Germany today, all of which were formerly licensed by the Military Government, are:

*Frankfurter Rundschau*. Publishers and chief editors: Arno Rudert and Karl Gerold. Press run, 135,000. Political orientation: left of center but independent, favorable to European cooperation and, for the most part, friendly to U.S. policies.

*Frankfurter Allgemeine*. Editors: Hans Baumgarten, Erich Combrowski, Karl Korn, Paul Sethe, and Erich Welter. Press run, 56,900. Conservative in business and economic affairs, but its independent editorial writers present a variety of positions on political issues. High standards of style and presentation.

*Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung* (Stuttgart). Editors: Helmut Cron, Otto Hoffmann, Rudolf Kircher, and Jürgen Tern. Press run, 50,600. Politically independent; expresses the view of the business community in political and social matters. Maintains a high level of journalism.

*Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich). Editor-in-chief: W. Friedmann. Press run, 202,000. Politically independent, oriented Westward. The most important paper in Bavaria.

*Hannoversche Presse*. Editor-in-chief: Wilhelm Korpeter. Press run, 176,000. Hews rather closely to the Social Democrat line.

*Rheinische Post* (Cologne). Editor-in-chief: Dr. Frank Vogl. Press run, 215,000. Expresses the view of the left wing of the Christian Democrats.

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The result was twofold: The doctor not only obtained his license to open the clinic but was appointed to the Board of Health as well. Recently in Weinheim, Baden, following a newspaper's denunciation of autocratic methods used by the local police in obtaining statistics on miscarriages, the police changed their procedures. The *Frankfurter Rundschau*, in conjunction with Radio Munich, at one point initiated an investigation of the Foreign Office, charging that former Nazi officials occupied key positions. Munich's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* entered the fray and printed a series of pictures and biographical sketches of the men in question. As a result of the concerted efforts of press and radio, some high officials saw fit to resign from the Foreign Office.

A few months ago, the democratic press nipped in the bud a proposed Federal law that would have hampered the freedom of the press. Recent attempts of an important German political party to browbeat two prominent editors into submission have been completely unsuccessful. Ordered to drop their support of German integration with the West and German contribution of troops to the European Defense Army on pain of ejection from their party, these editors have continued their vigorous support of both measures. Thus far the party has not carried out its threat.

These are typical examples of the many courageous actions taken by the new German press. They are far more significant than the imperfections which undeniably exist. Objective reporting and an interest in the public welfare may help the new press to weather a period of considerable public misunderstanding and skepticism as to its aims and services. A recent poll shows that only 42 percent of the West German people support the principle of the freedom of the press. A bare majority of the people questioned, 55 percent, believe that newspapers today are more trustworthy in their reporting than were those of the Third Reich.

The response of a cross section of the German people to the opinion poll may be discouraging to both German press and watchers abroad. From their own statements, many Germans seem unable to recognize honest reporting when they see it, and many question the propriety of publishing facts that embarrass the Government. However, the old adage, "Actions speak louder than words," applies to Germans too. What the German people have been saying about the press is considerably at variance with what they are doing about it. Circulation statistics speak tellingly. They disclose that the same individuals who criticize all newspapers continue to buy and read the best.

• *Mr. Straus, author of the above article, was with the Office of Military Government for Germany from May 1945 to January 1947. He is now public affairs specialist in the Bureau of German Affairs.*

## Goals of U. S. Policy in Germany

*Following is a transcript of a radio interview with Dr. James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, which was broadcast over the Voice of America on February 9, the date on which Dr. Conant left for his new post:*

Press release 74 dated February 9

*Interviewer:* Dr. Conant, you are about to embark on a job that is relatively new to you. Could you give our audience some idea of your feelings about this job and your views of the problem it will bring?

*Dr. Conant:* In undertaking my new assignment my first thoughts concern the grave responsibilities that are inherent in the position that President Eisenhower has asked me to fill. I am aware of the tremendous scope of the new assignment. Conscious of the success of my predecessors in meeting the many problems that arose during their terms of office, I only hope that I may be able to carry on the great tradition that they established.

As you know, this is not my first visit to Germany. As a young professor of chemistry I spent 8 months visiting the German universities. This was during the period of the Weimar Republic. I was concerned mainly with examining the organization of the universities and inquiring into the sources of that spirit which had made German universities preeminent in all fields of scientific research. Nevertheless, I also learned a great deal about the economic and political problems of those difficult days so long ago. I was then impressed, and have been ever since, with the importance for the whole civilized world of what happens in Germany. As a European power its tremendous economic and industrial resources are obvious. So, too, are its great intellectual and scientific capacities and its cultural traditions.

In the last few years I have been concerned with the problem of how these resources and capacities can best be marshaled and utilized to make possible a constructive contribution to the welfare of Europe and the entire free world, and how a possible misuse of such power for destructive purposes can be prevented. I know that there are forces both inside and outside Germany which periodically try to interfere with the sound development of the nation's potential. This is a problem to which I shall continue to devote my attention in the interest not only of my Government but also of all who wish for the peaceful integration of the Western World. But I also recall from my visits in the '20's that there are democratic elements in Germany completely devoted to the cause which unites the people of the free world. These elements will find a friend in me. It is my hope that, together with their help, Germany will once more attain the position in international affairs which will permit a full and

productive use of her great resources. I am optimistic about this prospect in view of the progress which has been made since the war—progress which in large measure is due to the statesmanship of Chancellor Adenauer.

*Interviewer:* How do you view the current movement toward European unity that is taking place?

*Dr. Conant:* The movement of the European nations from national separatism to greater union is to my mind the most encouraging development of the postwar period. The survival today not only of Europe but of Western civilization depends on the success of the free nations in seeking security through cooperation.

The evolution of a true European community, with a democratic Germany in its midst, based on common political institutions, sharing the wealth of its industrial resources, and dedicated to the defense of its great cultural heritage, is the hope of free people everywhere; it is also a beacon light for those who are deprived temporarily of their liberty by a totalitarian regime.

The Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan have been the first milestones on the way to such union. With the establishment of the European Defense Community [Edc] another decisive step will have been taken not only to cement the foundation of the "New Europe" but in the words of President Eisenhower, "to advance peace and the security of the free world."

The consummation of this process is, and must remain, the responsibility of the peoples of Europe themselves. But in fulfilling this task, they can be certain that the American Government and the American people will follow their efforts with deep sympathy and with high hopes. In his inaugural message President Eisenhower said:<sup>1</sup>

In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality. Only as free Europe unitedly marshals its strength can it effectively safeguard, even with our help, its spiritual and cultural treasures.

As I assume the challenging obligations of my new office, I wish to assure you that my mission will be to continue the work begun by Mr. McCloy, namely, to further, to the best of my abilities, the voluntary association of the Federal Republic with the community of European nations. Thus, through EDC and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Germany will be joined with the other nations of the Atlantic community in defense of freedom.

*Interviewer:* Dr. Conant, as you know, there is a widespread interest among the German people in the reunification of Germany. Do you think that progress can be made toward this end?

*Dr. Conant:* The peaceful reunification of

## Secretary Dulles Visits West Germany

*Printed below is the text of a statement made by Secretary Dulles at Wahn Airport, Bonn, Germany, on February 6, during his recent tour of Europe.*

[Telegraphic text]

Mr. Stassen<sup>1</sup> and I are grateful for the warm hospitality shown us here in Germany and for the intimate exchange of views which took place concerning matters of vital concern to us all.

I regret that time did not permit a visit to Berlin on this occasion. I recall my visit there on the airlift in 1948. We in the United States are, now as then, vitally interested in the welfare and security of this city and we share the determination of the Berliners to maintain their liberties.

In bidding you good-by, I am happy to know that we shall be able to renew our discussions with your Chancellor in Washington this spring.

<sup>1</sup> Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security.

Germany remains one of the major goals in American policy. I shall do everything in my power to help carry out this policy. However, the success of this policy depends entirely on Soviet willingness to permit the reunification of Germany under conditions of freedom. Current Soviet actions in Berlin and the purges in the Soviet zone have made me wonder whether the Soviet Union has any desire whatever to create the prerequisites for unification. I am appalled by the purges and arrests now taking place in the Soviet zone, by the persecution of entire population groups, and by the obvious attempt to root out any residues of political freedom and equality.

*Interviewer:* You mentioned Berlin, Dr. Conant, and Soviet action there. Do you believe that the American position in Berlin can be held?

*Dr. Conant:* Our position in Berlin can be held and must be held. Shortly after my arrival in Germany I expect to go to Berlin to familiarize myself personally with the problems of that city. I realize that the economic harassment, the increasing influx of refugees, and the attempts by the Soviet authorities to undermine West Berlin morale represent a problem that must be tackled with dispatch and determination. But, with the help of the Berliners, and the necessary support of the peoples of the free world, Berlin will continue to be the free world's outpost.

I should like to add, if I may, the following: I am looking forward to working with the German people. I know that honest cooperation based on mutual confidence will insure the success of my mission. *Auf Wiedersehen!*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

## Tax Treaty Discussions With Germany

Press release 81 dated February 11

U.S. and German tax officials will meet in the early future for technical discussions to see whether a basis can be found for conventions for the avoidance of double taxation of income and of estates of deceased persons.

If the discussions are successful, draft conventions will be prepared and submitted by the participants for further consideration by their respective governments.

In preparation for the discussions, interested persons are invited to submit information and suggestions to Eldon P. King, Head, Office of International Tax Relations, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington 25, D.C.

## Submission of Claims for War Damage in West Germany

The Department of State announced, on February 11 (press release 82), that owners of property located in the Federal Republic of Germany or the Western sectors of Berlin are eligible to file a claim, under the German law on the equalization of burdens, for physical damage to such property during World War II. Claims may be filed by natural persons only and must be submitted on or before August 31, 1953, to the Equalization Office (*Ausgleichsamt*) in the district where the property is situated. An Equalization Office exists in each city and county. In the event the claimant does not know the name of the city or county in which his property is located, he should send his application to the competent State Equalization Office (*Landesausgleichsamt*) with a request that it be forwarded to the proper local office. The address of the appropriate State Equalization Office can be obtained from the German consulates listed below. The forms for the filing of applications for the determination of damage are obtainable in Germany from the local German authorities or in the United States from the German consulates at any of the following addresses:

745 Fifth Avenue, New York 22, N.Y.  
8 South Michigan Avenue, Room 901, Chicago, Ill.  
1026 Hurt Building, Atlanta, Ga.  
Central Tower Building, 703 Market Street, San Francisco, Calif.  
3450 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif.  
International Trade Mart, New Orleans, La.  
1320 Bryant Building, 1102 Grand Avenue, Kansas City, Mo.  
905 Securities Building, Seattle, Wash.  
2711 Book Building, Washington Boulevard, Detroit 26, Mich.

While U.S. citizens and residents will be primarily concerned with the war-damage features

of the Equalization of Burdens Law, the Department of State pointed out that claims may also be made for certain types of postwar damage or loss. These concern (1) damage arising out of expulsion from German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line or from territory outside the 1937 boundaries of Germany; (2) damage sustained in Eastern Germany now under Soviet control or Polish administration; and (3) damage resulting from currency reform in regard to investments made for savings purposes. Due to residence and other requirements, U.S. citizens and residents will not in most cases be eligible to file claims for losses falling under these categories.

The Department of State has prepared the attached memorandum<sup>1</sup> containing basic information for the benefit of interested persons seeking advice on questions concerning their rights under the Equalization of Burdens Law. However, the Department cautions all claimants that it is not able to give advice on the merits of individual claims or to interpret the German law with respect to a particular case. Requests for information of this character should be directed to the local German authorities with whom the claim is filed. Any assistance which a claimant may require in the preparation of his application should be obtained from an attorney in Germany or one in the United States who is familiar with German laws and procedure. Since the law will be administered by German officials, the application should be prepared, if possible, in the German language and a copy retained for reference in future correspondence.

Claimants are advised that the actual payment of war-damage claims will not be made until the total amount of damage in Western Germany and Western Berlin and the total of the funds available for the payment of that compensation have been determined. Under the Equalization of Burdens Law this determination must be made not later than March 31, 1957.

## Discontinuance of Current Copper Allocations

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on February 12 that, following a review of the supply-demand position, its member governments have agreed to discontinue the current (first quarter) international allocation of primary copper, with effect from February 15, 1953. Although it now appears unlikely that there will be need for further international allocations of copper, the Committee will review the position again in March when a further statement will be made.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Text of the memorandum may be obtained by writing the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.



## U.S. Rejects Charges of Anti-Polish Acts

### U.S. Note to Poland

Press release 75 dated February 9

*On January 16, 1953, the Polish Foreign Office addressed a 19-page note to the American Embassy at Warsaw<sup>1</sup> protesting against alleged anti-Polish acts by the United States. The note charged "the brutal violation of Polish territory . . . by an aircraft belonging to the armed forces of the United States" and "the organizing of aggressive intelligence and subversion on Polish territory." The note represents one facet of the currently stepped-up Communist propaganda campaign, throughout the Soviet bloc, aimed at vilifying and discrediting the United States. Following is the text of the American reply to this note which was delivered to the U. S. Embassy at Warsaw on February 9:*

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions of the United States Government has the honor to reject categorically the unfounded charges in the Ministry's note of January 16, 1953, alleging aggressive attempts by the Government of the United States on the security of Poland. With specific reference to the last paragraph of the Ministry's note of January 16, the United States Government rejects the allegations of the Polish Government that an aircraft belonging to the Armed forces of the United States violated Polish territory on November 4, 1952, and that the United States has organized aggressive "intelligence and subversion" on Polish territory.

The charges are very clearly a part of a larger pattern of accusations made with increasing vehemence during the past few months by a number of governments dominated by a single totalitarian political party. As the Polish Government is well aware, these recent charges have been leveled against Christians and Jews, Communists and former Communists, workers, peasants and intellectuals, and even against many once prominent and trusted officials occupying positions of great power in the very governments which are now making the charges.

The free world, and no doubt many in that part of the world which is not free, has viewed these accusations with profound skepticism and deep disgust, seeing in them the characteristic excesses of men hysterically fearful that they will lose the absolute power which has corrupted them. To the extent, however, that this macabre process of almost daily accusation actually reflects a genuine

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

struggle of men to be free and masters of their own thoughts and souls, the Government and people of the United States cannot be disinterested.

Sympathy and concern for the welfare and aspirations to freedom of peoples of other lands has been a continuing and important feature of American history from the beginning of the United States as an independent country. The names of Pulaski and Kosciuszko, of Kossuth and Krzyzanowski, of Paderewski and the elder Masaryk, all of whom found haven and support in the United States during their struggles for the freedom of their homelands bear eloquent testimony to the continuing American interest in the liberty and independence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Polish Government in its note of January 16 alleges that while the American nation desires peaceful relations with the Polish nation, the policy of the Government of the United States is anti-Polish. The absurdity of this contention is apparent to anyone acquainted with the democratic and representative nature of the political institutions of the United States which ensure, contrary to the situation which prevails in totalitarian regimes, the faithful reflection of the popular will in the policies followed by the Government of the United States. In any event, the question of whether the policy of the United States Government is anti-Polish is one which the United States is happy to leave to the judgment of history, confident that the record clearly shows that from its earliest beginnings as an independent country, the United States has always been, and remains, a firm friend of Poland.

It is also impossible to understand the grounds on which the Ministry bases the fantastic allegation that the United States Government desires to transform Poland into a colony of the United States. It is understandable that under the conditions which prevail in Poland at the present time many citizens of Poland might entertain legitimate fears regarding the possible reduction of Poland to the status of a colony, but it is certainly not on the Government of the United States, that responsibility for these unfortunate conditions rests.

A very few years ago both Poland and the United States fought side by side in defense of their national existence against an evil and powerful enemy. For several years after that war, the United States, through official and unofficial channels, undertook a massive and varied program of economic assistance to the people of Poland. As a part of that assistance, UNRRA, which was financed largely by the United States, delivered to Poland food, clothing, medical, industrial and agricultural supplies in the amount of \$477,927,000. This was more than was supplied to any other European country, and was one-sixth of the total assistance granted to all war-devastated countries throughout the world.

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Moreover, it was the Polish Government itself which announced in July 1947 a decision not to participate in the European economic recovery program which offered additional great possibilities for rebuilding war damage in Poland and for raising the standard of living of the hard-pressed Polish people.

In its note of January 16, 1953 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw fit to return to the subject of Section 101 of the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, and to repeat the baseless charges contained in its note of December 19, 1951 and January 12, 1952. As the Polish Government was informed more than a year ago, Section 101 of the Mutual Security Act is intended to provide assistance to victims of oppression, where such assistance has been determined to contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic Area. The purely humanitarian program for extending care and assistance in resettlement to refugees which is now being actively carried out under this legislation is completely consistent with the policy of the United Nations of rendering assistance to people who have been forced to flee from their homelands.

With regard to the allegations in the Polish note under reference attempting to establish a connection between the Embassy at Warsaw and the murder of a Polish radio announcer, the Government of the United States states categorically that these allegations are groundless, and that the Government of Poland must be aware of that fact.

Concerning the further allegation that United States Government information activities have sown hatred toward Poland, it is to be noted that the aim of these activities with respect to Poland is to provide accurate news and commentaries on important developments to the Polish people who, cut off from such information by their own authorities, are naturally eager to be informed by other means. As the Government of the United States observed to the Polish Embassy at Washington in a note of September 20, 1951,<sup>2</sup> history abundantly proves that governments which adopt the policy of denying their peoples access to all the avenues of truth have done so at their own loss.

During the past century and three quarters Poland has several times been partitioned by powerful neighboring states, and at times has been occupied by one of them. During these tragic years of Polish history, no people and no government has had a warmer admiration for the unquenchable Polish love of liberty than the people and Government of the United States, and none has had a firmer faith in the final outcome of the Polish struggle for liberty and national independence.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 652.

## Austrian Treaty Deputies Suspend Meetings

*In answer to questions concerning the meetings of the Austrian treaty deputies at London on February 6 and February 9, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following statement on February 10:*

Andrei Gromyko furnished further proof that the Soviet Union has no intention of concluding an Austrian treaty and desires that Austria continue as an occupied country. During yesterday's meeting, the Western deputies had repeated the simple fact that they had met to agree on an Austrian treaty. The French chairman [Etienne de Crouy-Chanel] suggested that anything could be discussed that would lead to a treaty. He proposed that the long draft treaty be discussed inasmuch as he assumed that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to conclude a treaty on the basis of this draft only.

Mr. Gromyko, however, again insisted that no discussion could take place until the so-called abbreviated treaty was withdrawn. He refused to be budged even after the Western deputies declared that they might withdraw the abbreviated treaty if a just and equitable treaty could be concluded on any other basis, including the long draft, without further delay. The Western deputies in fact formally proposed that discussion begin by going through that draft, the long draft. When the Soviet representative saw no way out, he simply said: "I have nothing to add to my previous position."

The Western deputies then agreed that no further purpose would be served in continuing discussions made futile by Mr. Gromyko's position and agreed to suspend further meetings pending submission of reports to their governments.

## Accord Reached on Sudan

Press release 89 dated February 14

*Secretary Dulles on February 14 sent the following messages to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt on the occasion of the accord reached on the Sudan by the two Governments.<sup>1</sup>*

### Message to Foreign Secretary Eden

Achievement of the Sudan accord by the British and Egyptian Governments is indeed gratifying to the United States. As it affects the Sudanese, it is in the best tradition of British regard for the

<sup>1</sup> Terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Accord, which was signed on Feb. 12, provide almost immediate self-rule for the Sudanese and self-determination of their future status within 3 years.

orderly political evolution of a people toward self-government, and is a tribute to the patient statesmanship which your Government has consistently addressed to this difficult problem!

I believe the settlement is one which the three peoples concerned—British, Egyptian, and Sudanese, can view with equal satisfaction as appropriate to their respective interests, and as providing a solid foundation for friendly, mutually beneficial future relationships.

This amicable accord may well be the first step toward the establishment of more fruitful associations in an area of critical importance to the security of the free world.

#### Message to Foreign Minister Fawzi

The United States is gratified that an agreement on the Sudan has been arrived at by Egypt and the United Kingdom. This is a truly im-

portant occasion. It affords an opportunity for me to express my Government's pleasure at the spirit in which these difficult negotiations were carried out.

My Government trusts that the same spirit of good will and cooperation will characterize the transitional period preceding the decision by the Sudanese people of their future status. The amicable resolution of this long outstanding question goes far toward creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust in the Near East which can only result in great benefits for all the nations of the free world.

My Government continues to follow with interest and sympathy the progressive attitude and energetic efforts of the Government of General Naguib to meet and overcome the internal problems which face the Egyptian people. The United States wishes the Egyptian Government every success in its efforts.

## The United States and the Underdeveloped Areas

by Stanley Andrews

Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration<sup>1</sup>

It is more than a pleasure for me to come to Wisconsin today to talk to this important group of men and women from the farms and towns and villages of Wisconsin. It was here at the University of Wisconsin a little more than a year ago that representatives from many of the countries in which Point Four operates gathered for a study of the general problem of land reform.<sup>2</sup>

While I shall discuss this phase of Point Four work a little later, I would like to add here that in four of the countries which are now acting to improve land distribution, tenure, and credit, four of the men in charge of this effort attended the World Land Tenure Conference in Wisconsin.

In my talk here today, I shall try to report a little of what the Point Four Program of technical cooperation has been able to accomplish over the past 2 years. I shall suggest why the accomplishments of the program are important in these un-

easy days. I shall try to indicate why I think this program as it now operates is not primarily an unselfish missionary effort on the part of our country but rather a hard-headed enterprise which, if successful, must benefit not only the peoples with whom we work but will directly benefit the people of the United States who are putting up the money and sending their technicians overseas.

The Act for International Development, under which the Technical Cooperation Administration operates the Point Four Program, authorizes three basic activities. One is the sharing of know-how through technicians, plus the funds and equipment to make their work effective, with countries that want to attack some basic problem. Another activity under the act is the encouragement of private investment in these areas and the creation of the "atmosphere for investment." Third, the act provides for the training of nationals of cooperating countries in the United States—what is called the "trainee program."

In the first and third of these activities, I think it can reasonably be said that we have "a show on the road." There are some 1,400 technical per-

<sup>1</sup> Address made in connection with the observance of Farm and Home Week at Madison, Wis., Feb. 4 (press release 65 dated Feb. 3).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 660.

sonnel abroad now in 35 countries. They are assisting in development and training in practically every field from labor productivity in a textile mill in Iran, or a coal mine in Afghanistan, to the better use of a wooden plow in the valley of the Jordan. There are trainees from almost all of the 35 countries in the United States, some 1,300 of them at the present time, renewing or expanding their knowledge on everything from biochemistry or tractor repair or transportation or public-health services to basic concepts of primary school education.

### Yardsticks for Measuring Underdevelopment

In the field of encouraging private investment, some worthwhile areas have been explored and some valuable lessons learned. But we still have a long way to go.

This field of activity, in my opinion, deserves extended study and effort not only on the part of Government but by the leaders of private enterprise in this country. All of us need to take a more penetrating look into the whole problem, not only from the standpoint of "private interest and profit" which is important but because our national interest and our standard of living in this country depend on it. We cannot sell something to a person who has nothing.

Let's look a moment at what is termed an "underdeveloped" country. What are the norms or yardsticks that one may use to measure degrees of underdevelopment?

Here are a few statistics which might serve as a sort of yardstick. But I hasten to point out that it is not the objective of Point Four to reproduce in this great area the material standards of the more highly developed areas. I am going to compare certain figures in three categories: the so-called "underdeveloped" areas; the intermediate states; and the highly developed and industrialized areas such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

Based on U.N. figures, here's about the story:

	Under-developed	Intermediate	Developed
Annual per capita income, in dollars . . . . .	41	154	461
Mechanical energy, per capita horsepower per day . . . . .	1.2	6.4	26.6
Life expectancy in years . . . . .	30	52	63
Physicians per 1,000 people . . . . .	.17	.78	1.06
Food consumption, calories per day . . . . .	2,150	2,760	3,040
Cloth consumption, pounds per person . . . . .	4.8	7.52	18.63
Population literate, in percentage . . . . .	22	80	95
Elementary school teachers per 1,000 people . . . . .	1.76	3.42	3.98

Now, let's look at the family unit in these areas. The chances are that the family we seek out will be dark-skinned. It will be a family with a rich heritage of culture, an ancient tradition, a well-defined concept of living, and with values far different from our own. The family will be living in a village home which it has occupied for generations.

This family will cultivate a plot of ground which has been in cultivation for hundreds of years. It may be a piece of communal land belonging to the village or to a family or dynasty, owned and operated by its various members over many years. Or it may be land owned by some landlord or corporation. It will be a small piece of land, probably from 1 to 20 acres. The house will be of stone or adobe, if in the dryer sections, or of bamboo, if in the wet torrid zones.

There will be a father and a mother with perhaps six or eight children living, and possibly a birth record or twelve or more. The others have died before maturity. The family's chief crop will be rice, or wheat, corn and barley, or sugar cane, or industrial crops like rubber, sisal, and jute. The chief diet will be rice or cereal, with some fruits and vegetables and occasionally fish.

The power on the farm will probably be a carabao or an ox with an occasional donkey or horse, camel or cow. The farm implements will be a wooden spade, maybe an iron spade, and a plow hoe. Rarely will anything resembling a breaking plow or a disc harrow be found. The harvest equipment will be a small knife attached to the two fingers of the right hand, or perhaps a sickle. The threshing will probably be done with oxen walking over the grain on a threshing floor and the grain will be cleaned by winnowing in the wind. In some areas there will be a small foot-pedaled thresher and occasionally a gasoline-driven fanning mill.

There will be no furniture in most of these homes. Bamboo floor covering, a mat spread on the floor at night, and an iron brazier for cooking and heating are the standard equipment. Clothing will be scant and for everyday wear of simplest cotton. Silk may be seen on the most festive occasions for which the inherited fine dress of centuries will be brought out.

Most of the family members will belong to and attend regularly a church of the ritualistic and formalized religion of the area, often predating Christianity by thousands of years.

If the family is fortunate enough to own any of the land on which it lives and works, that is probably its greatest material achievement. If they are nonowners, then the most cherished dream of the family may be to call some of that land its own. We have gone far enough to indicate that sheer poverty is representative of a great majority of the rural families in this so-called "underdeveloped" belt.



## Raising the Standard of Living

So much then for the yardsticks on an underdeveloped country and the people and areas where our technicians are joining forces with technicians of host countries in an attack on some of their basic problems. The direct fundamental objective of the Point Four Program is to help raise the standard of living of the peoples with whom we work. There is only one way to raise the general standard of living of any area and that is by an increase in the goods and services which human beings use—in other words, increased production of food, of fibers for clothing, of materials for shelter, and of the resources of the country which may be exchanged for other goods—to the end that all may have more.

Usually this attack on increased production starts with agriculture, then with forest and mineral developments, and increased productivity and efficiency of industries or productive enterprises which the country has. It is not an effort to pick up giant factories or transport great industrial systems bodily from America to these areas. We start with what we have. If it is agriculture, the American technician must go along with a local technician or leader, begin where the farmer is with his wooden hoe, if that is all he has; with his scant acre of land, which is often all he has; with the water and the sun and the soil as it stands. In some way we must contrive by application of known principles to start increasing production. This can usually be done with the introduction of good seed. Often a simple change in the planting methods will do the trick. Sometimes it is a simple matter of planting a little earlier or later. Or maybe thinning or spacing of plants will help. But start we must where the people are and move forward and upward.

The same technique must be followed in the field of public health, in sanitation, in improved housing. It would be easy to draw up a design for an ideal house in the Nile Delta, for instance, and then to have a contractor build it and give it to the fellahin in the village in place of his mud hut. But there is not enough money in all America to do that sort of thing. Even if a way could be found to buy the materials and give them to that villager, he could not even afford to pay the hauling cost of them to his village or to hire anyone to help him put up his house. So American technicians, if they are going to help the fellahin of the Nile out of his miserable and dirty hut, must find a way to use Nile mud so that the villagers themselves can construct with the materials and skills at hand a suitable and sanitary house.

If the malarial mosquito is ever to be wiped from the Nile or from the coastal plains of Iran or Sumatra, Americans must work side by side with the local people, giving them help in forms of necessary materials and supplies and technical

training to lead them into doing a gigantic job. It will not perhaps be done by any spectacular new way but by leadership and training in the basic and known ways of tackling a problem, whether it be the choking up of a harbor, breakdown of a rail transport system, factory improvement, or some deep and long search into a scientific problem dealing with agricultural production or mineral development.

I would like to relate by the hour stories of how Americans, your friends, and some of them your neighbors, are in their common sense and unassuming way tackling problems and solving them with their counterpart technicians. There's the story of an American locomotive engineer, several years retired, who was sent to Indonesia to see if he could help in the better use of locomotive power on that nation's railroads. On arrival there, he found the repair shops in chaos, many of their locomotives on the dead line and not many pulling freight. Working with local repairmen, he crawled into boilers and fireboxes searching out the causes of trouble. He determined that the use of muddy water was causing the interiors of the flues to scale and to prevent the heat in the fireboxes from getting to the water, and the heat was going up the flues instead of into the water. The simple cleaning of water, the reorganization of repair shops, and some shifting of switch tracks and loading facilities literally revolutionized that railroad in a short time.

I'd like to tell you about new wheat our technicians assisted in introducing into areas of Iran last year and how this year the returns have come back one hundredfold; how the incidence of malaria, which for a thousand years in some villages in the Middle East and in South America has stood at about 80 percent, has been reduced to 20 percent.

There's a coal mine in Afghanistan where a couple of men from the U.S. Bureau of Mines have helped to double production in less than 1 year and at the same time get more of the coal out of the drifts and promote safety in the mine—a thing unheard of in that part of the world.

## Point Four Assistance in Jordan

Let's for a moment look at one of our teams at work in a small country like Jordan. Let's see what has taken place there over the past 18 months.

Jordan, as you all know, steps right out of Bible history. Until recent years it was a part of the Palestine Mandate under the old League of Nations, administered by Great Britain. Soon after Jordan gained independence, came the Palestine war, and the area which normally carried something less than a half million population suddenly became the home of nearly a half million more people—refugees.

Then came locusts and a drought and last year

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famine stalked the villages of Jordan, and the bones of the flocks of the Bedouins parched on the desert. The first U.S. aid for Jordan was not technical cooperation but three cargoes, about 30,000 tons of wheat to prevent starvation. When our technical program got under way, one of the first things it did was to see that another wheat crop was planted and produced. This year Jordan, thanks to her own efforts, our help, and weather has enough wheat to meet her normal needs.

The big job is how to carry over from the fruitful years so that in the lean years there will be food. Joseph saw that problem and solved it in his day. Jordan, with some American technicians and an engineering firm, is tackling that problem now with a new type of desert-storage arrangement which will permit the carrying over of wheat from one crop year to the other.

It sounds simple, but when you are in a land where a simple burlap sack is a luxury and where equipment to handle or store bulk grains is unknown it is not simple.

This one demonstration storage bin is being built with money from the American taxpayer. If it succeeds—and we are sure it will—Jordan plans to build enough storage bins to carry over about 300,000 tons of grain in the good years to the lean years. Then at least the threat of periodic famine will be averted.

Then there is a desert-pasture program under way. People of Jordan mostly live by their floods. It always rains at some time of the year no matter how hot and dry the desert may become later. So the object is to catch and hold the rain which falls all at once, from about November to February, to let it soak into the ground and produce grass for forage later in the year—even though the grass dries up. The Romans tackled this problem 2,000 years ago when they built great ground tanks about 60 meters square and 3 meters in depth. These tanks, 500 of them along the valley of the Jordan River, filled with water in the rainy season and stored water for irrigation. They were the watering places for the Bedouins and their families. But the wind drifts of the desert, the rains and silt of the years, have filled in these tanks and they have remained unused for 500 years. Last year, Point Four provided a second-hand dragline and an American technician to train young Jordanians to run it. They cleared out one of these giant tanks and last spring when the rains came it filled with water. One of the sights this fall that took one back square into Bible days was the Bedouins camping by that tank on the Eve of Christmas with their flocks grazing and watering around it.

But merely cleaning out those 500 tanks will not do the job that is necessary today. Some of our desert experts, with experience in our own dry lands, have worked out a system of long undulating dikes, literally terraces, thrown up to hold

the water in a strip across a vast space. The water thus held stops erosion, soaks into the ground, and sufficient water remains in the ground to produce quick growing grass. In one area right now there are some 600 acres of green lush grass growing in a strip along one of these dikes where green grass like that has not grown for centuries. Needless to say the Bedouins who must live by grazing their flocks in the desert are very excited about this project.

Since time immemorial and according to custom of the area, Jordan has kept its womanhood behind the veil and rarely have women taken part in public life or community leadership. Now a school has been established in Jordan which is training the first group of young women to become school teachers and to teach other young women. The first class will be graduated this spring.

Over the centuries, Jordan has had no such thing as a testing laboratory or any of the necessary equipment, let alone skills to fight disease, to deal with insects and micro-organisms which attack plants and animals and humans.

Point Four has filled the request of the Government of Jordan for about 175 thousand-dollars worth of laboratory equipment, equipment which constitutes the necessary machinery and utensils for a complete research and testing laboratory. This will serve not only Jordan but other areas of the Middle East. Today on one of the main streets of Amman a two-story building is going up, the land donated by the State of Amman, the work done by builders in Amman. This part of the project is locally financed. The building will house the Point Four equipment and soon four or five research and testing specialists will begin training local Jordan people to take over the work which the laboratory is designed to carry on. No state can progress today without the basic research which precedes visible improvements by some span of years. We must know things before we have anything to teach, to train, and to extend.

#### Value of Training Nationals

Let's turn now to the matter of training nationals of Point Four countries in the United States. Last year more than a thousand men and women, most of them leaders in their own countries, came to America at Point Four expense and spent from as little as 30 days to as long as a year studying in fields of their particular interest. These have been extension workers, farm leaders, labor leaders, road builders, industrial engineers, school teachers, government administrators, and public-health leaders.

Now and then there have been some rather cheering results, such as the young men who attended the World Land Tenure Conference here in Wisconsin and were ready to assume responsibility and leadership in their own countries when

the time was ripe. There were also the young men from Iran who attended the Cooperative Credit Conference at the University of California last year. They are now out training leaders in Iran and helping to set up credit societies and banks, to administer loans, and to give supervision to the new farm owners under the Shah's land-distribution scheme.<sup>3</sup> We feel that more of this type of training must be done in the country where these folks live. We believe the number coming to this country should be held to a minimum.

Some of the things which these men and women see in this country are by no stretch of imagination applicable to their own countries and some of them are a little bewildered by this gadget-conscious America. However, as one of them told me, "The thing we get from America above all things is the value you place on the individual and the attention your Government gives to the opinions and the welfare of the single individual."

That idea, I think, is worth spreading. For above the physical and material needs of the countries from which Point Four trainees come, is the need to dignify the worthwhileness of the individual. So I think most of the trainees coming to this country carry back with them something which can be applied in their own countries.

I had a dramatic demonstration of this recently in a South American country when a great airliner, in which I and some 56 others rode, got into trouble and had to land in a little pasture airfield in the jungle. A young man in the control tower on that field guided us safely in. That lad had been trained by the Civil Aeronautics Administration in this country on a scholarship supplied by the American taxpayers. I was startled and somewhat reassured to find that in at least 12 other airports I visited on that South American tour, a majority of the tower operators, traffic men, radio operators, and radar operators were lads who had been trained here in the United States on these scholarships.

#### Private Investment on a Partnership Basis

May we turn now for a few moments to the private investment side of this Act for International Development, which authorized the Point Four Program. Frankly, I do not know how much the American Government can do to "encourage and expand private investment" in foreign lands, as the Act directed. Certainly something can be done in the way of guarantees, in tax laws, and in treaties between the United States and different countries, which give assurance of fair treatment for American capital.

Many of these countries remember the time when foreign investments were followed by fleets and

armies and colonial domination. They are suspicious of too much talk, and the Communists on the other side never let them forget it. So it appears to me that American or other foreign capital entering any of these underdeveloped areas now will have to come, first, by invitation and on the basis of the country's desires and requests rather than by the old style concession type of development; second, it will be selective rather than general.

I, for one, do not believe that the American taxpayer, through his Government, should put up the investment capital necessary in many of these countries. Neither do I think it is America's responsibility to see that the investments needed are made only by Americans. As a matter of fact, nearly all of the industrial nations can and should take part in this sort of development. I am confident that it must be on a partnership basis and of a nature which will contribute to the economic and social development of the country involved as well as to the profits and economic strength of the foreign investor.

In conclusion, then, you as interested citizens and taxpayers of the United States are entitled to ask: Where do we go from here; what does the United States get out of this effort? To begin with I would say, among other things, the satisfaction that we are accepting some of our responsibilities of world leadership; second, by helping countries to develop their human and material resources, and to raise their standards of living through increased production of goods and materials for human use and for world trade, we move toward a more stable economic situation in these areas and thus improve the outlook for peace.

Third, while the Communists charge that we are doing this in order that the United States will have a cheap source of raw materials, I will meet that challenge by saying that the future peace and well-being of the free world depends on orderly and sound economic development of all its resources, and that the people of the underdeveloped areas have everything to gain from this sort of partnership development.

Last, the increase—even the slightest increase—in the standard of living of these billion people in Point Four areas will improve trade between these areas and the free world. We cannot trade with a pauper, and the best trade the United States enjoys today is with our greatest competitors—Canada, England, France, Western Germany, Japan, and Italy. The United States sold to the industrialized countries some \$5.80 worth of goods per customer last year. We sold only 70 cents worth of goods to the man we've been talking about in the underdeveloped areas. These programs—to use a term used many years ago by a great President—are simply "enlightened self-interest."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1952, p. 535.



## How Shall a Christian Look at Point Four?

by Stephen P. Dorsey

Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs<sup>1</sup>

The Point Four Program, as it has come to be called, was set forth formally by President Truman as a "bold new program" in his inaugural address just 4 years ago this January.<sup>2</sup> Bold though the program may have been, it was not new. As a Government we had been engaging in this type of international humanitarian cooperative action to some degree for many years, and in the other Americas to the south in very considerable volume since 1939. Long before that, private corporations and American missionaries had carried the same concept to every continent. It was in 1834, for example, that Eli Smith, a missionary from Northford, Conn., set up the first Arabic printing press in Syria.

What then is Point Four? What problems does it face? How does it seek to solve them? Why is it of special interest to us as Christians?

The appellation, Point Four, is certainly an inexact term, except that the proposed program was the fourth on President Truman's list of American foreign-policy objectives set forth in his address of January 20, 1949. Yet for want of a better name it caught the public fancy. And as such, American technical cooperation in the international field has come to be known since that date.

This fourth point was as follows:

... we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques.

The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our considerable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

... we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. . . .

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

### Example of Bipartisan Policy

This in itself, as I have said, was not a new concept for Americans in or out of government, or indeed for certain other nationalities. However, its announcement by the Chief Executive of the United States as a major national effort in our relations with "have-not" countries, and as an invitation to other "have" countries to join us in that effort, was certainly a bold and forward step. And the interesting fact is that, despite partisan differences regarding other American aid programs during the last 4 years, there has been relatively little dispute over this concept of sharing our wealth of technical knowledge with our less fortunate brothers elsewhere in the world. Indeed, Point Four is a living example of bipartisan foreign policy at its best.

The formal announcement of the program on a world-wide basis invited the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country. From the beginning, voluntary organizations, as widely separated as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, voiced their support of this concept along with the churches which have, I believe, formed its strongest foundation stone. Indeed, it was largely the example set by

<sup>1</sup> Address made at Washington before the Adult Group, Department of Christian Education of the Diocese of Washington, on Feb. 11 (press release 84).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

our religious missions of all faiths among hungry peoples in many lands which gave us as a nation the vision to adopt as a basic arm of foreign policy a program which in simplest terms would help people to help themselves abolish misery. Our missionaries going out into the world to teach Christian religion have taught—they have not imposed. And they have not confined themselves to teaching—they have practiced Christian Democracy. In their teaching they have shown us the basic principles of working in harmony with foreign peoples as individuals. It is from their experience that we have perhaps come to know best that human understanding cannot be bought as a commodity, but that it *can* be won by the Christian precept of doing unto others as we would have others do unto us. As one observer put it "Our missionaries have lived with the people of the land and not off them, and have brought a message not only of religious salvation but of social enlightenment."

And lest we think that these acts are wasted on those of other faiths, I should like to quote a precept of one of the other two great monotheistic religions written many centuries ago. The Holy Koran states that "The attribute of those who spend their wealth in God's way is like the attribute of a grain which grows into seven ears, in each ear a hundred grains—for them is their reward with their Lord, and there is no fear on them, nor shall they grieve."

#### Humanitarian and Political Motives

The motives behind Point Four, I believe, are twofold and inextricably interrelated. They are both humanitarian and political. I think we can quickly reject any suggestion that the effort was designed to accelerate a new form of imperialism in the guise of economic development. While economic development is generally good, in and of itself, and while we may hope as an industrial nation for wider markets in a world with greater wealth and a higher standard of living, our record as "a wicked imperialist power" has hardly been effectual in recent years. We allowed the Philippines to obtain independence while we aided her economically. In the Marshall Plan agreements we asked for no special privileges for American citizens from members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. We have permitted much of our postwar assistance to be dispensed through the United Nations and its specialized international agencies.

The gap between the high and low standards of living in the free world today is tremendous, and not comfortable even for most of us on the high side. To many individuals it is a terrible responsibility to be a citizen of the richest and strongest country in the world, and the humanitarian urge as a compulsion for action abroad is not new. For many years, groups within the more developed

countries have sent missionaries, doctors, teachers, agricultural experts, and the like to far away lands with no thought whatsoever of recompense—at least on this earth. The very fact that you and I are here tonight, in this particular church, is in large measure, I think, due to the relatively unappreciated efforts over almost a century of the missionaries sent to these raw Western shores from England by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Ports and the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge.

The emphasis behind Point Four was clearly placed on the real benefit to our country, and to the general welfare of all countries, through the elimination of misery and suffering in substandard areas. This is both humanitarian and political.

Misery and suffering are not new phenomena. But today the contrasts within the world still free from the Communist yoke are very great. Half a billion people have already succumbed to communism. They are learning by tragic experience that promises of food do not banish hunger, nor pledges of freedom blot out the fearful shadow of the slave camps. We cannot blame these people for having been misled, unless we share the blame ourselves. I personally believe that had enough people cared about the Christian missionary program in China, it would not be behind the Iron Curtain today. More important now, however, is to help those who can still be saved.

Now, what are the facts about the free world to which we still have access? What are the facts behind the threat that the peoples of free Asia, Africa, and Latin America—more than a billion—may turn to communism in their determination to find a better daily life for themselves or at least for their children?

Fact number one—The great majority have on the average 25 percent less food than they need for good health.

Fact number two—Two out of three of these men, women, and children suffer all their lives from typhoid, malaria, dysentery, trachoma, bilharzia, and yaws—diseases that are preventable. Average life expectancy is 30 years.

Fact number three—Their annual income averages about 80 dollars—not enough to buy you a full set of Western clothes.

Fact number four—Seven out of ten of these unfortunate people cannot even read the basic teachings of their own religions.

These are the reasons why these peoples of the world are engaged in revolutions which often lack a fair sense of direction, and why they offer a fertile field for the false promises of communism. We cannot content ourselves with the thesis that the whole of the problem is totalitarian aggression. The problem is deeper; it is rebellion against hopelessness in a world of plenty, against early death in an age of miraculous cures, against

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ignorance in a new age of learning. The piteous search of millions is for the dignity of man, the basic Christian Democratic principle which dialectic materialism does not recognize.

These facts indicate the humanitarian challenge which inspired the formalization of a technical cooperation program. At the same time, in and of themselves, they form the political problem which the Point Four Program with its strong humanitarian motive seeks to solve.

For they are compounded by another fact. The Soviet Government, not content with dominion over one-sixth of the land area of the earth, has embarked on a campaign to make the whole planet its own. Its system is cruel and hostile enough to pursue a policy of relentless expansion by subversion and by force. At the same time, it is so clever as to employ every false appeal to decent human desires in a campaign of uncertainty and suspicion. With tyranny its aim, materialism is its faith. In its totalitarian ideology, freedom under God has no place, and a nation such as ours cannot endure. Only eyes clouded by fear and starvation can seek food promised by such a voice.

And so, forced by the Kremlin's grim insistence on world conquest, we must forge our weapons strong and invincible. They are made by the hands and minds of men, walking straight and free, each in his own way, to become one with God. Here, production is man's servant, not his master.

But at the same time we must offer to those less fortunate than ourselves, a way. That way is one of a steadily improving material existence and an endlessly fuller spiritual life. That is the problem—the essential problem, and the motive—both humanitarian and political behind Point Four.

There are those who say that we Americans today are ourselves materialists. We, they say, have left behind a faith that inspired our forefathers to build this nation. I grant that on occasion we have swerved from the path. But I would say that we, a young people, have not finished our course. And I believe that the innate, spiritual strength of the United States is still alive and, with all our faults, the most hopeful fact in the world today.

As I have said, we are a young people and—God knows—in many ways a simple one. An agriculturist friend of mine once reminded me that there are few of us today who have not had at least one grandparent who was brought up on a farm. That is a good and healthy bond with these other peoples of whom I have just spoken. Less than four generations ago it took the labor of 85 percent of our forefathers to feed the nation. Today the process is reversed. Through science and technology, hard work and courage, 15 percent of our people feed the nation and have produced enough to keep millions elsewhere from starving. I am proud that as a people we can

speak in one voice of "three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves" and, at the same time, of the "American dream."

May we keep moving forward, within our borders, in fulfillment of the American dream! Outside it, may we lead the world along the same road! For we hold it to be a matter of God-given law that all men are created equal and that their inalienable rights are those of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And we cannot work out alone our destiny in this contracted world of chaos today.

#### **Skill and Knowledge To Meet the Challenge**

How would the Point Four Program meet this challenge? Basically the means, in simplest terms, is our own skill and knowledge. The late Dr. Henry Garland Bennett, who gave his life on a Point Four mission, once spoke, during the year he served as the Point Four Administrator, of this skill and knowledge in the following terms:

Skill and knowledge adapted to new conditions and environments by men who believe in the brotherhood of mankind which enables Protestant Christian, Roman Catholic Christian, Moslem and Hindu to work and live in harmony according to common principles of right and wrong; skill and knowledge shared so that the man who once plowed with a wooden stick now fashions his own new steel point, so that the man who once grew one bushel of rice and had to beg half the year, now grows two.

American skill and knowledge are flowering abroad today through two principal channels. First, the sending of American experts to underdeveloped countries is affording those countries the benefits of American skills and techniques to help solve—on the ground—local problems in the fields of agriculture, public health, education, and industrial development. At the same time, promising young technicians in the same fields are being taught the latest American methods through training grants with American Government departments, universities, and corporations. There are roughly 1,000 such trainees in the United States today under Point Four auspices, and still more in American educational institutions abroad. The American University at Beirut, founded in 1868 by Presbyterian missionaries, is today training 128 young people from all over the Middle East in these fields under Point Four grants. They comprise only a part of the student body of more than 3,000 in this institution which is endowed primarily with funds contributed by private American sources, including the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.

Moreover, through the United Nations, regional conferences have been sponsored and experts have been sent out from specialized agencies with enough initials for a lengthy session of anagrams: WHO (World Health Organization); FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization); ILO (International Labor Organization); ICAO (International



Civil Aviation Organization); UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization); IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); and, finally, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)!

### Examples of Point Four Aid

There are some 1,500 Point Four workers abroad in 35 "underdeveloped" countries. (This figure excludes U.S. technical assistance to the Marshall Plan countries of Europe, for administratively speaking, they are not part of Point Four.)

Some Point Four workers abroad are administrative, but others, not included among the 1,500 Point Four workers, are members of private organizations under Point Four contract. Let me give you a few examples of what some of them are doing.

In India, known for its teeming millions and its famines, Horace Holmes, a county agent from Tennessee, has stimulated villagers in an area of 100 square miles to double their production of wheat—the staff of life. He did it primarily by inducing them to plant a different type of seed, actually a type developed not far away in the Punjab, and by suggesting a new type of plow, one with an iron rather than a wooden beam which can be produced for \$3.25 and can do four times as much work and do it more effectively.

In the dry desert land of Saudi Arabia, with its immense oil reserves, Glenn Brown, a water geologist, has traveled thousands of miles in his jeep identifying previously unknown water resources. In a land where water seems scarcer than oil, could we have a better shirt-sleeve ambassador? I might add, incidentally, that Glenn Brown's appointment in September 1950 made him the first Point Four technician in the Arab world.

In Jordan, with the aid of a giant bulldozer, Point Four has cleaned out a great Roman water tank which had been useless for centuries. Nomads may take their flocks to it for the rain water it holds, and others are now being cleaned out. Last winter when there was a cave-in on the Amman-Jericho-Jerusalem Road, Point Four's earth-moving equipment cleaned up the damage in a day or two. It would have taken several weeks by hand. The part of the bulldozer in American diplomacy is greater than is generally realized. I might add that the whole Roman cistern project, including training of Jordanians, was carried out by a private American firm under contract to Point Four.

Baby chicks have been flown to Iran. It has been demonstrated that better breeding and better feeding can increase egg production from 50 to more than 150 per hen per year. I do not pass on these statistics for your practical use, but rather as one of the thousands of examples of how Point Four is helping especially poor and fatalistic

peasants to obtain more food and more income, and to meet the Lord part way.

In Lebanon, 24 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation experts under the Point Four program are concluding a 2-year study of the possibility of harnessing the Litani River basin so that the country will have sufficient electric power to meet the expanding needs of its agriculture, industry, and individuals, and to irrigate new lands. This is not "another survey," for when it is completed this autumn it will be possible for the Lebanese to take it to the banks, and to say in businesslike fashion "What will you charge to finance part of this project?" As well as to say to engineering firms "Here are all the details. Give us a bid and we will consider you for the job."

### Private Capital Needed

Point Four's monthly report gets larger each issue. I recently looked at one which required 17 pages merely to list the 35 countries and the broad nature of projects within these countries—"textile training," "babassu nut industry," "tax consultant," "handicrafts," "fishery survey," "highways," "rural education," "maternal and child health plan," "locust spraying," "vocational education," "water resources," etc.

But technical assistance in itself is not enough. Underdeveloped areas must be able to put to use new skills through the provision of capital moving through public and private channels. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is making available, on a sound basis, capital for the basic necessities of economic development such as transportation, harbors, irrigation, and power.

Through cooperation between government and private sources, measures are being undertaken to reawaken the participation of private venture capital in many specialized applications where private initiative and management experience can open new opportunities in the fields of production and distribution. Thus, private capital can contribute to the expansion of economic opportunity and eventually carry the main burden of development.

The program offers no immediate panacea for the world's ills. It faces a long-term task. There are not enough available technicians or sufficient monies to cure the ills of centuries in a day. But, in my opinion, it offers the best means we have over the years, to establish a new community of nations that is free from fear and immune to false promises.

It has been said that "God works in mysterious ways, his wonders to perform." Can it be that the awful scourge of communism has been held over free man so that he shall at last see with new eyes the misery of his brother and rise to help him? If that be so, we may be the very humble servants called to bring closer the Kingdom here on earth.

I shall not say how a Christian shall look at Point Four. To me it is self-evident. The answer lies in the words of Jesus, who said:

Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee hungered, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger and took thee in? Or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.

## Unsettled and Unpaid Claims Against Cuba

Press release 68 dated February 5

On September 4, 1952, the Department of State announced that the Cuban Government had arranged for the reception of unsettled or unpaid claims against that Government that arose prior to October 10, 1940, and that have not been adjudicated in the Cuban courts.<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State has been informed that the time for the submission of such claims (previously indicated to have been February 5, 1953) has been extended by the Cuban Government to June 4, 1953.<sup>2</sup>

It is suggested that all those who have pending claims of the above description against the Cuban Government, and who have not received a copy of a memorandum issued by the Department of State on September 2, 1952, containing instructions made public by the Cuban Government for the preparation and submission of such claims, should promptly communicate with the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Washington 25, D. C., and it will furnish a copy of the memorandum upon request.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 454.

<sup>2</sup> On Feb. 9 the Department announced (press release 77) that it had also been informed that the Cuban Government requires that all claims applications submitted to it shall be prepared in the Spanish language, in duplicate, and that all documents in the English language in support of the claims shall be accompanied by translations into the Spanish language, in duplicate.

## Lord Ismay To Visit U.S.

Press release 88 dated February 13

Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, will pay a visit to the United States in March at the invitation of the U.S. Government. Since his appointment in April 1952, Lord Ismay has already visited five other NATO countries: Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Italy, and the Netherlands, at the invitation of their Governments.

During his visit Lord Ismay will be accompanied by Lady Ismay and by a small staff from the International Secretariat. He will arrive in the United States on March 11. His visit will include several days in Washington where he will call on President Eisenhower and on high officials concerned with NATO affairs.

He will also visit the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, USN) at Norfolk, Va. He will return to New York on March 19 and sail for Europe on March 21.

## Indictment Brought Against Arms Export Violators

Press release 86 dated February 12

The Department has been advised by the U.S. Attorney at Dallas that on February 12 a Federal Grand Jury at Dallas returned an indictment charging 11 persons with conspiracy to violate the arms-export provisions of the Neutrality Act which are administered by the Department.

This indictment follows several months of intensive investigation by various U.S. agencies of the unlicensed traffic in arms across the Mexican border. These investigations were conducted by special agents of the Office of Security of this Department and the customs agents of the Bureau of Customs with close cooperation of the Mexican authorities.

It is hoped that the action instituted at Dallas and the continuing investigation of arms export violations will provide a deterrent to this traffic.

## The Cold War and the United Nations

by Ernest A. Gross

Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 3

Most of us have at one time or another wondered why the Soviet Government thought it useful or necessary to sign the U.N. Charter. For surely the Charter is not only the antithesis of everything international communism stands for, but it has been proved over and over again that the Kremlin leaders never had the slightest intention of complying with the Charter in the first place.

Soviet adherence to a system of international cooperation was, of course, rooted in a cynical interpretation of Soviet self-interest. For this reason, there are a few who argue that the mere fact that the Soviet Government joined is clear evidence that we were foolish to have done so, and for that matter, that we should "pull out" precisely because the Soviets have stayed in. There may be a certain allure in forming policy on the basis of doing everything contrariwise to the Soviets. However, most people hesitate to let the Kremlin navigate our ship, which they could thus do, merely by pointing our compass south if they wanted to send us north.

My reason for mentioning Soviet adherence to the Charter is not to speculate concerning their motives for doing so. The stark fact is that the Soviet system is in open revolt against the Charter. The question arises whether, under that circumstance, the United Nations has a survival value, either from the point of view of our national interest in particular or that of the free world in general.

It is necessary to appraise the United Nations in the light of its original purposes, its method of operation, and our own stake in it. But, more particularly, we must consider where the United Nations is left—and where we are left—by reason of what I have called the Soviet revolt against the Charter.

<sup>1</sup>Address made on Feb. 4 at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia.

These are the questions with which I now propose to deal.

### Nature and Purposes of the U.N.

Like all determined efforts to achieve collective security, the United Nations was born of the greatest of all "collective insecurities"; that is, a world war. One frequently hears the question asked whether it is possible to develop a workable system for collective security in the presentday world. The question is a fair one, but I suspect it means different things to different people because of the many variables of the definition of the term "collective security." I must confess that, as I define the term, the question does not arise at all. To me, collective security is merely a way of describing the objective of sharing the burdens and responsibilities of common defense. To the extent that common interests are identified and common exertions made to carry them out, there is a growing, constantly changing, dynamic creation of collective security.

The United Nations represents the high point, up to this moment of recorded history, of worldwide effort to identify common interests and to develop procedures for sharing the burdens of common defense of those interests.

The U.N. Charter does not commit the error of interpreting too narrowly the interests which men share merely by reason of being members of the human society. It recognizes the diverse and widespread enemies to these common human interests. Nor does the Charter err by giving short weight or measure to the means by which these enemies can be cooperatively faced.

To put it more plainly, the Charter counts among the enemies of decent human society not only aggression and imperialisms great and small, but also those equally ancient enemies of man: disease, poverty, illiteracy, and slavery. Therefore, when I define collective security as the means



of sharing the burdens of common defense, I include these among the enemies and perils against which we erect our defenses.

The primary specific purposes of the U.N. Charter are (1) the maintenance of international peace and security, and (2) the promotion of conditions in the world which, in the language of the Charter, are "necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations" (article 55). It is obvious these two primary purposes are interrelated. For example, we find that international disputes frequently involve differences of view regarding the method and timing for giving effect to the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Generally, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the functions of the United Nations are conceived to be to assist in the settlement of disputes and to take action to prevent breach of the peace or to repel aggression.

The framers of the Charter draw a distinction between procedures for settling international disputes (as to which no organ of the United Nations was given power to make enforceable decisions) and action in the case of breach of the peace. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states. Few, if any of them, were willing to vest in an organization that degree of sovereignty which would be involved in dictating the terms of the settlement of a dispute. Would the people of the United States be willing to delegate to the United Nations, or any other body, the right, let us say, to award the Panama Canal to another state in the unlikely event that we found ourselves involved in a dispute with another state which laid claim to the Canal?

Nevertheless, the General Assembly and the Security Council may *recommend* terms of settlement of a dispute. Hence, the distinction drawn in the Charter between disputes and breaches of the peace is more theoretical than real.

With regard to action to prevent breaches of the peace (as distinguished from the settlements of disputes) or to restore international peace or security if it has been broken, the decision and enforcement powers of the United Nations were deliberately limited by the veto. I think it is important to evaluate correctly the problem created by the Soviet abuse of the veto. There is no doubt the Soviet Government has abused its reserved power, but this, along with the Soviet boycott and walkout, is merely a symptom of its general attitude of defiance and revolt against the Charter.

I think it is illusory to blame the voting procedure as the cause of difficulty, rather than as a symptom of the disease. Nor do I believe that the major powers, including the U. S. Government or people, would favor a change in the Charter leaving to majority vote decisions involving the use of force or matters closely connected therewith. That is my personal view.

It is also the view of such an expert on the Charter as Dr. Pasvolsky, who, incidentally, has pointed out the fact that the possible effect of the voting arrangements agreed upon at San Francisco was foreseen. He says:

There were no illusions as to the limitations that such an arrangement would impose upon the effectiveness of the proposed organization, nor as to the possibility that the great privilege which the major nations thus claimed for themselves might be abused. . . . The underlying theory, however, was that if one of the major nations were to prove recalcitrant, or were to refuse to abide by the rules of international behavior that were being inscribed in the Charter, a situation would be created in which the recalcitrant nation might have to be coerced; and it was apparent that no major nation could be coerced except by the combined forces of the other major nations. This would be the equivalent of a world war, and a decision to embark upon such a war would necessarily have to be made by each of the other major nations for itself and not by any international organization.

I think this analysis is borne out by the disposition of a similar question arising under the North Atlantic Treaty. It will be recalled that article 5, the heart of the treaty, provides that in the event of an armed attack against any party to the treaty, each other party will take, and I quote, "such action as it deems necessary" to restore and maintain the security of the area. This language was, of course, carefully considered, and, although it is a commitment of the highest moral value, I believe that its explicit reservation of the right of unilateral decision is relevant to an appraisal of the question whether the U. S. Government would be prepared completely to forego its veto power.

This is not to say that we, the U. S. Government, have not sought consistently to limit the area in which the veto is used. I, myself, voiced the attitude of our Government on this matter during a meeting of the Security Council in 1950 in which I said: "It is the policy of the United States to restrict the use of the veto by extending whenever possible, by example, by precedent or by agreement, the area of Security Council action in which the veto is not applicable." The fact remains that each of the major powers, without any illusions on the subject, kept in its own pocket a key with which it could lock the door to substantive decisions by the Security Council.

However, it is true nevertheless that this fact has proved to be of little significance principally for two reasons. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, the same Soviet intransigence which accounts for its abuse of the veto power would also have led the Kremlin to do what it could to obstruct the carrying out of decisions of which it disapproved. And the facts of power being what they are, an attempt to coerce Soviet compliance would involve the highest policy for each state in determining its own course of action.

Second, a U. N. *recommendation*, as distinguished from a Security Council decision, has a political and moral compulsive quality which I

do not believe was fully appreciated at San Francisco. One has to observe the vehemence, not to say violence of arguments for or against a resolution, proposed for adoption by the General Assembly relating to, let us say, human rights, self-determination, Palestine, disarmament—to give but a few illustrations—to realize how much importance is attached to recommendations by the General Assembly. And it should be remembered that the General Assembly, under the Charter, has no power to make decisions, but is limited entirely to recommendations. Moreover, it is revealing that from the very start of the aggression in Korea, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have limited themselves to making recommendations to member states. Nor was it the threat of the veto that produced this result in the Security Council in June and July of 1950, inasmuch as the Soviet representative was not present in the chamber for these meetings.

These considerations, I think, have a direct bearing upon an appraisal of the value of the United Nations in the painful and patient efforts to develop a collective-security system. The veto-free General Assembly, where the organized community of nations passes moral and political judgments, assumes more and more importance as Soviet intransigence becomes more and more obvious. It has been possible by procedural means wholly within the Charter to make the General Assembly a more workable mechanism for the purpose of dealing with disputes and threats to the peace. This was, of course, done through the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950.

I turn now to the second major purpose of the United Nations; that is, the promotion of world conditions necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. The work of the specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the like, as well as the work of the Technical Assistance program, the activities of the Economic and Social Council in the field of human rights, and the supervision by the Trusteeship Council of areas of the world which do not govern themselves—all these activities I shall not do more than mention. Their basic importance is too well understood to require argument.

The point I wish to stress here, however, is that the framers of the Charter were aware that such matters as higher standards of living, full employment, health, cultural and educational problems, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—that all these matters are basic to conditions of stability and well being which, and I again quote the words of the Charter, are “necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.” It is in this way that the Charter identifies that common interest which must underlie common effort.

The fact that the Soviet Government fails to

cooperate or to contribute toward efforts to deal with common problems does not diminish the necessity for facing them. I do not suppose anyone would argue that the World Health Organization should be disbanded because the Russians are not members. Yet, this is precisely what would happen if the advice were heeded of those who advocate disbanding the United Nations on the ground that the Soviet Government is not carrying out its Charter obligations.

#### Our Stake in the U.N. Future

This leads me to consideration of the future of the United Nations and our stake in it, keeping in mind the nature and purposes of the organization as I have attempted to outline them above.

It has become somewhat fashionable to say that part of the difficulty faced by the United Nations at home arises from the fact that it was “oversold” to the American people. Perhaps this is the right word—I do not wish to quibble about the word—but I wonder whether it would not be more accurate to say its nature and purposes were *misunderstood*, rather than *overvalued*.

It is true that certain assumptions, or I should say hopes, were in the air at San Francisco. These included the hope that the peace treaties would be speedily settled, that those who suffered so grievously, including the Soviets, would be willing to cooperate to restore their economies and rebuild their cities, and that the horrors of the war would have taught even the Communists the values of collective measures against aggression. The frustration of these hopes, however, has not, in my judgment, invalidated the premises upon which the United Nations was founded. To the contrary, I believe the very frustration of these hopes has underscored the necessity for carrying on the effort. I say this because the United Nations was not born of these hopes, but as a response to a perceived need, created by what I have referred to as the “collective insecurity” of two world wars. The hopes I have mentioned generated a degree of enthusiasm in support of these efforts. And it is natural that the frustration of the hopes has diminished the enthusiasm.

However, it is a dangerous *non sequitur* to argue from this that the abandonment of the hopes justifies the abandonment of the organization. I think we would all agree that if Soviet obstruction in the United Nations outweighed the advantages we derive from carrying on the organization as now constituted, we should indeed withdraw. The answer depends, among other things, upon an analysis of what are the objectives of our leadership, and what is our national self-interest in this matter.

Starting from the definition of collective security, which strikes me as a realistic one—the objective of sharing the burdens and responsibilities of common defense—it follows that it is in our en-



lightened self-interest to develop this community of interest and effort to the maximum practicable extent.

I do not believe it is a digression to consider at this point the nature of our system, particularly as contrasted to that of the international Communist conspiracy. Our society is, of course, based upon a moral and legal structure. This is exemplified by the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, the device of the truly secret ballot to select our leaders and the tradition of accountability of those leaders. Ours is a society which reflects the optimistic assumption that human beings by nature desire to cooperate with each other to their mutual benefit, and that the creation of conditions in which such cooperation can be carried on is the first duty of a society. Free exchange of ideas and information, the maintenance of conditions of health and welfare, and loyalty to a code of ethics and morality form the sinews of our social structure.

The totalitarian system, classically illustrated by Soviet communism, is, on the contrary, founded on pessimism. The urge to unrestrained power, to aggression, and to dictatorship may be explained as an expression of a philosophy which I would call the "expectation of evil." It is not enough to explain Soviet imperialism as being based on a fear of encirclement. The question is why do totalitarian systems characteristically fear encirclement? Why, in particular, does the Soviet ideology base its system not only upon a preconceived hostility to our way of life, but also upon an inner compulsion as well as an avowed commitment to destroy it?

Dictatorships can only be maintained by suspicious and fearful men who expect evil from their fellow men. Success in the competition for power goes to him who most ruthlessly acts on the basis of fear and suspicion, who most cleverly rationalizes his ruthlessness, and who never for a moment relaxes his expectation of evil from his colleagues. These he regards as fellow-conspirators rather than as friendly associates.

A contrast between the assumptions on which their system and ours is based goes to the root of the problem as how best to organize the international society to deal with the menace with which our own way of life is confronted.

There is an important principle to be deduced from the fact that both their system and ours, contrasting as they may be, have one attribute in common; that is, that they as well as we are driven by a law of human conduct to apply the same standards in their dealings abroad which they apply in their relationships at home. We have all observed the practice of Soviet representatives in the United Nations of putting forward positions which are, in themselves, extreme. We have seen that they put forward these extreme positions with an air of finality which discourages negotiation

and often with attacks on motive as well as with a violence of expression which offends the listener.

Visitors to the U.N. debates often wonder why the Kremlin leaders ordain the use of these techniques and whether they hope or expect to convince anyone by them. However if one follows, even casually, the methods of expression used by the ruling group within the Soviet Union itself—in speeches by party leaders, in periodicals, and in radio broadcasts—one finds exactly the same manner as is employed by Soviet representatives in international forums such as the United Nations.

The objective both at home and abroad is not to convince, but to coerce. Coercion and fear are woven into the police-state fabric as part of its very nature.

Soviet representatives to the United Nations are themselves driven by fear with a close checkrein.

Now, with respect to our own system, there is a healthy and inevitable demand that our spokesmen well and truly reflect the American tradition and way of life. The public opinion which guides and restrains the government of a democracy forbids governmental spokesmen in international forums, even for short periods or on specific issues, from putting up a false front.

Accordingly, for quite different reasons, we find that both in the case of a democratic society and of a police state, there is an apparently inexorable "law of consistency" which can be simply stated: It is impossible for a society to reserve one set of standards to be used at home and apply another set of standards in its dealings abroad.

The identity between the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Constitution of the United States is often overlooked or forgotten. The principles of the Charter are not only a direct reflection of our own culture and traditions, but they are at the same time principles to which men of all races, places, and religions respond and lay claim. It is to our clear advantage that governments throughout the world be committed to them.

#### **Why We Should Support and Strengthen the U.N.**

I would list the following four principal reasons why it is in our national interest to support the United Nations and seek to strengthen it.

1. *It is probably the most potent and certainly the most convenient method of identifying interests common to the free world and of stimulating common effort to meet dangers confronting those interests.*

The United States, richly endowed as it is, has acquired a position of leadership in the world by reason of forces beyond its control—forces which shape the destinies of nations as well as of man. The power, which is ours by nature, and which we constantly generate by reason of the excellence of our system and our attributes, is one of the important facts of international life. However, as Pres-



ident Roosevelt said in his last message on the state of the Union (January 1945):<sup>2</sup>

... in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

Our whole system is based upon the proposition that power is not an end in itself and that force, like fire, is a friend of man only when it is managed and controlled. As the historian, Bagehot, said: "It is the function of force to give moral ideas time to take root."

The United Nations is therefore the link between power and responsibility.

For a democracy, world leadership can be maintained only by following the rules of behavior—the code of responsibility—which shapes its own society at home. The essential bond is moral unity, and this can only be based upon a knowledge of common objectives and confidence in our integrity. The U.N. Charter defines the common objectives of a free society. Our commitment to carry them out builds confidence in our sense of responsibility. Moreover, the United Nations is one of a set of mechanisms, however imperfect, designed to carry out these common objectives.

I stress the fact that the United Nations is but one mechanism. It was never intended to supplant other forms of diplomatic, political, and economic intercourse.

2. *The second important consideration, which flows from what I have just said, is that the United Nations provides the framework and the foundation for regional organizations and other collective activities to keep the peace.*

As one looks back, for example, to the debates in the Senate which attended the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and as one reads the report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, one is struck by the close relationships which were perceived between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.

Thus, the Foreign Relations Committee was at pains to emphasize that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not what it called "an old-fashioned military alliance," but that, if it could be called an alliance at all, it is, in the words of the Committee, "an alliance against war itself." Truly this is a concept which is justified, but which I submit can be justified *only* on the basis that NATO is designed as a fortress to defend the Charter.

The United Nations is the rock upon which this and other regional fortresses are built. It is, moreover, important that we should not become confused as to which is the rock and which the fortress.

The foundation supplied by the United Nations

for collective action is, of course, most dramatically illustrated by Korea. The United Nations, during the current session of the General Assembly, achieved its greatest moral unity with regard to the Korean aggression when 54 nations voted for a resolution sponsored by the Government of India.<sup>3</sup> In supporting this resolution, the entire free world rallied around the moral principle that the prisoners of war should not be forced against their will to return to slavery or death.

The Communist aggressors in Korea, together with their Soviet sponsors and supporters, have been morally isolated by this unanimity. The consequences are bound to be far reaching, particularly in those areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East which have now declared their allegiance to the standards of morality in which they have such a deep and common interest. For, in the last analysis, it must be clear that the Communist aggression in Korea, if it had been permitted to go unchecked, would have extinguished one of the oldest and proudest nationalist movements in the world—that of the Koreans. The preservation of this nationalism is therefore symbolic of the principle of self-determination, which is both the goal and the aspiration of populations in many areas of the world. Korea is an example of how a common interest can be identified and supported. For here we have seen the growth of a realization among 54 nations of the world that they have a common interest not only in resisting aggression, but also in supporting a nationalist movement which has survived a history of oppression and subjugation.

3. *A third consideration justifying our support of the United Nations is the importance of developing methods to aid in settling international disputes.*

I do not believe this point requires an extended justification. However, it is an objective which takes on a particular urgency in the face of Soviet attempts to exploit all disagreements and disputes arising in the free world. This is, of course, particularly true with respect to disputes involving national aspirations for self-government and independence. The relative ease with which these moves can be subverted has always been recognized in Communist dogma. In 1924, for example, Marshal Stalin said: "The national movements for the freeing of the oppressed countries from the imperialist yoke contain unexhausted revolutionary possibilities."

Similarly, with respect also to disputes not involving so-called "colonialism," the Soviet Government passes up few opportunities to fish in troubled waters. A year ago, the Soviet representative in the Security Council suddenly intervened in a debate concerning the dispute between India and Pakistan over the disposition of the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1945, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

State of Kashmir.<sup>4</sup> The burden of the Soviet intervention was to attack the honored and respected U.N. representative as a "tool and spy of Wall Street imperialism." He also assailed the motives of the United States and the United Kingdom, professing the absurd belief that it was our objective to gain control of the State of Kashmir for some sordid purposes of our own.

We are preoccupied quite understandably with problems caused by the tensions between the Soviet system and the free world. However, we should not permit ourselves to disregard the fact that the problems which divide and separate the free world, within itself, are serious and that some of the greatest successes of the United Nations in its short history have been the settlement of these conflicts or the bringing about of the end of armed warfare. Illustrations may be found in Indonesia, Palestine, and Kashmir.

4. Finally, it is essential for us to support the constructive work of the United Nations in the economic and social fields. These are the problems which form the highest common denominators of interest in binding together the peoples of the world—those who are free and those who wish to be free.

#### **"Kicking the Russians Out"**

I concede that one may accept everything I have said up to this point as justifying our continued participation in and support of the United Nations, and yet ask whether it would not be better from our point of view if the Soviet Government and its satellites were not in the organization. This is more popularly referred to as "kicking the Russians out." It is a legitimate question, and I should like to deal with it, expressing purely personal views.

I have already said that if we should conclude that Soviet participation in the United Nations is disadvantageous to our enlightened self-interest, it would be foolish for us to continue to support the organization as presently constituted. It is my contention that the interests of the free world and the principles of the Charter, which reflect those interests, are better served by our not disbanding and destroying the organization. That would, of course, be the result of our withdrawal. There is no way of expelling the Soviet Government, even if this should be desired, inasmuch as the Soviet Government could veto an attempt to deprive it of U.N. membership. But I assume that when people talk about "kicking the Russians out," they realize this, and what they really mean is that we should withdraw and, so to speak, "take the United Nations Charter with us." Incidentally I am not certain whether, under such

circumstances, our copyright would be universally recognized!

Now, as I see it, there are a number of advantages which accrue to the free world from Soviet membership in the organization. And this, despite the fact that the Soviet Government and its satellites have failed to participate in the constructive work of the organization, have abused their veto power, and have in other ways carried on their revolt against the Charter system. Indeed, I think it may be said fairly that in any real sense of the word the Soviet Government has never really "joined" the United Nations. But they are members and, except for a relatively brief period of general walk-out on the Chinese representation issue, they attend meetings of the Security Council, of the General Assembly, and of other principal organs of the United Nations.

I think one may list the following advantages to us in their continuing to do so, if it is in fact their intention to do so.

In the first place, their commitment to the Charter is a convenient and I should say important method of holding them accountable. It is important to realize that the Charter is a code of conduct which is inconsistent with, and excludes the ideology of, international communism. Although, of course, they only pay lip service to the Charter, nevertheless, whatever the reason they may have had in signing the Charter, they did sign a covenant at San Francisco which is an anti-Marxist "manifesto." They find themselves now either in open revolt against the Charter, or forced to resort to fraud and distortion in their pretenses at carrying it out.

It is of some significance that they have never, so far as I am aware, admitted to departing from the requirements of the Charter. They have always, on the contrary, gone to extreme lengths to profess adherence to it and pay lip service to it.

It would serve no useful purpose that I can see to release them from their pledges, however much they may violate them in practice.

Second, they are subject to psychological, moral, and political pressures in the U. N. forum. The United Nations is inherently what might be called an "open system." There is no room within the United Nations for secret conspiracies, plots, or hiding places. The pressures of the forum are intangible but nevertheless real. And I believe that the proof of this may be found in the extreme lengths to which Soviet spokesmen often go in attempting to rationalize or justify courses of action, however false their explanation may be.

Third, and I would in many ways regard this as the most important consideration of all—they are constantly forced to reveal the true nature and purposes of the Soviet system. The debate on the Korean question which took place in the first part of the seventh session of the General Assembly illuminates this point.

Mr. Vyshinsky, at one point while arguing

<sup>4</sup> For an account of Jacob Malik's intervention in January 1952, see *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 665.

against the principle that prisoners of war should be free to decide whether they wished repatriation, startled the Political Committee by baldly proclaiming that the prisoner had no will other than the will of the state.

It is difficult to dissemble in an open forum, and Soviet lies are easily unmasked. The United Nations is the supreme forum of self-revelation and I do not believe the Soviet system comes out of this market place for trading ideas with better bargains than we do.

*Fourth*, their presence in the organization and the processes of the organization itself enable weak or wavering states to cooperate with us without the appearance of choosing sides. It is perhaps unfortunate that neutralism or tendencies toward "third force" positions exist, but they do constitute facts of international life.

I have no doubt that it was considerably easier for the small states represented on the Security Council to vote in 1946 to call upon the Soviet Government to withdraw troops from Iran than it would have been for those states to have made separate diplomatic representations to the Soviet Foreign Office on this issue.

*Finally*, I think it is of value that the Soviet representatives are available for discussion. The example which leaps to mind is of course the informal discussions which led to the lifting of the Berlin blockade. I think it is unlikely that we shall, at least for a long time, be able to conclude so-called "general settlements" with the Soviet leaders. It is much more likely that the discussion and exploration of specific issues may perhaps over a long period produce a certain measure of agreement. Accordingly, it is of value to have a forum in which constant contact of individuals representing the respective governments may facilitate the exploration of these matters in a routine fashion.

The question is sometimes asked why, since the Soviet Government has unquestionably sponsored and supported the Korean aggression, they should be permitted to retain membership in the United Nations. I have already pointed out there is no way of expelling them, since they can veto a decision of that sort.

Even if this were not so, I think it does not take full account of the realities of the situation to regard membership in the United Nations as a sort of badge of merit. There are advantages in universal membership, even including recalcitrants, for reasons which I have just attempted to explain. However, one must distinguish here between the problem presented by the application of certain states for membership in the United Nations, since here the standards for admission are prescribed in article 4 of the Charter. So long as article 4 provides, as it does, that membership in the United Nations is open to peace-loving states which accept the Charter obligations and in the judgment of the organization are able and willing

to carry out these obligations, such a judgment must be made in good faith. It is indeed difficult to say that states such as Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are "peace-loving" or "are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the U. N. Charter."

It may be that it would have been wiser to omit these qualifications for new membership. Personally, I find it a cause of some regret that the Charter was written in this way. However, so long as these conditions for membership are imposed, I see no alternative but to honor them. Subject to this, I believe that the wider the membership of the United Nations, the more advantageous to the interests of the free world.

I should like to conclude by quoting remarks which I set down in print about 2 years ago, which I believe were timely then and, if anything, more timely now:

The United Nations is not a mere Charter of Containment. It is, potentially, a Charter of Liberation. It pledges liberation from the age-old enemies of poverty, disease, and fear of conquest.

The Charter is a magnet drawing vast populations who see in the Charter the expression of their hope and determination to live their own lives in well-being and freedom.

Our purpose is to make the magnet irresistible, strongly charging it with our own support and our own strength.

Even within the slave world of the Soviet Union and its satellites, there is now unrest and ferment. When national aspirations are subverted, when human aspirations are suppressed, an explosive force is built up. What that force can do when it generates sufficient pressure, we have already seen, and seen with encouragement, in the successful effort of Yugoslavia to free itself from Soviet domination. These same forces are at work in Eastern Europe and we may expect that in the course of time they will assert themselves in China, too. The free world will expand because men everywhere want to be free.

Every advance we make in the struggle for liberation is a step toward a world in which the Soviet leaders will be compelled to practice as well as to preach the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. When this has been achieved, peaceful co-existence may develop into mutual cooperation. Then the people of Russia as well as those in the satellite states, will once again take their rightful place in the family of mankind.

## U.S. Transmits Report on Katyn Forest Massacre to U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 10

*On February 10, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative to the United Nations, transmitted the following communication to Secretary-General Trygve Lie:*

**EXCELLENCY:** On September 18, 1951, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress provided for the establishment of a Committee to conduct an investigation and study the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn massacre, committed against thousands of Polish Army officers and civilians during World War II.

Department of State Bulletin



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The Committee held hearings in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. In the course of its inquiry into the responsibility for the massacre the Committee heard testimony from 81 witnesses, studied 183 exhibits, and studied and received 100 depositions taken from witnesses who could not appear at the hearings. In addition, the Committee staff has questioned more than 200 other individuals who offered to appear as witnesses but whose information was mostly of a corroborative nature. The account of the Committee's inquiry is set forth in the seven volumes entitled "Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", two sets of which I have the honor to transmit with this communication. The findings and conclusions on this phase of the Committee's inquiry are contained in the Interim Report.

I am enclosing 70 copies of the Interim Report<sup>1</sup> with the request that you transmit a copy of the Interim Report together with a copy of this communication to the Representative of each Member of the United Nations as a matter pertaining to United Nations objectives in the field of Human Rights.

It will be noted that the Interim Report contains references to the "Hearings" referred to above and enclosed herewith. May I ask you to make these volumes available to any Representative who may wish to refer to them.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Mexican Agricultural Workers.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2328. Pub. 4432. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico—Signed at México Mar. 9, 1951; entered into force Mar. 9, 1951.

**Agricultural Experiment Station in Bolivia.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2353. Pub. 4469. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Signed at La Paz Dec. 30, 1946, and May 16, 1947; entered into force May 16, 1947; operative retroactively Jan. 1, 1947.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Bolivia.** Treaties

<sup>1</sup> H. Rept. 2430 (82d Cong., 2d sess.) dated July 2, 1952.

and Other International Acts Series 2465. Pub. 4697. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Signed at La Paz July 24 and Dec. 13, 1951; entered into force Dec. 13, 1951.

**American Dead in World War II, Hamm Military Cemetery.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2445. Pub. 4703. 6 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Luxembourg—Signed at Luxembourg Mar. 20, 1951; entered into force June 11, 1952.

**Aerial Mapping, Pacific Area Project.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2407. Pub. 4712. 28 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Paris Nov. 27, 1948; entered into force Nov. 27, 1948.

**Weather Stations, Pacific Ocean Interim Program.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2488. Pub. 4717. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada amending agreement of Feb. 16, 1951—Dated at Ottawa Jan. 22 and Feb. 22, 1952; entered into force Feb. 22, 1952.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Confirmation

Donald B. Lourie

The Senate on February 13 confirmed Donald B. Lourie as Under Secretary for Administration.

### Check List of Department of State

#### Press Releases: Feb. 9-14, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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*77	2/9	Unsettled Cuban claims
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79	2/10	Dulles: American Council on NATO
†80	2/10	Who discussions at Geneva
81	2/11	Tax treaty with Germany discussed
82	2/11	West German war-damage claims
†83	2/11	Cabot: Inter-American Ecosoc
84	2/11	Dorsey: Review of Point Four
*85	2/12	Point 4 technicians graduate
86	2/12	Indictment of arms export violators
87	2/12	Dulles: Report on European trip
88	2/13	Lord Ismay to visit U.S.
89	2/14	Dulles: Anglo-Egyptian accord

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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